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THE BOUNDARIES

OF

MULTI-PARENTAGE

Jessica Feinberg*

ABSTRACT
Multi-parentage has arrived. In recent years, a growing number of courts
and legislatures have recognized that a child may have more than two legal
parents. A number of significant societal, medical, and legal developments
have contributed to the trend toward multi-parentage recognition. The
traditional family structure of a married different-sex couple and their biological children currently represents only a minority of U.S. families. Stepparents, non-marital partners of legal parents, and extended family
members often play a significant role in children’s lives, and it has become
increasingly common for same-sex couples to welcome children into their
families. In addition, advancements in assisted reproductive technology
have made it possible for a greater number of parties to play a role in a
child’s conception. At the same time, the law has expanded both the categories of individuals who are eligible to establish parentage and the mechanisms through which parentage can be established. While the trend in favor
of multi-parentage recognition is clear, the boundaries of multi-parentage
remain largely unsettled. It is imperative that in drafting their multi-parentage laws, states carefully consider how to address a number of important
questions. These questions include, for example, whether each of the child’s
existing legal parents must consent to the establishment of multi-parentage,
what (if any) cap should be set on the number of individuals who can
establish legal parentage, and how to avoid imposing a hetero- and bionormative family structure on LGBTQ+ families. After providing a detailed analysis of the complex issues involved in each of these questions, the
Article sets forth a number of proposals regarding how states should address these critical questions within their multi-parentage laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION

F

OR most of U.S. history, the law identified a maximum of two parents for each child. In recent years, however, legislatures and
courts have become increasingly willing to recognize the possibility
that a child may have more than two parents (multi-parentage). A number of jurisdictions have adopted statutes providing for the identification
of more than two legal parents under certain circumstances, and judicial
decisions in additional jurisdictions have reached the same result.1 There
is currently a clear trend toward legal recognition of multi-parentage, and
this trend shows no signs of slowing down.2
A variety of factors have contributed to the move away from strict adherence to the “rule of two.”3 In recognizing a maximum of two parents
for each child, the law has long sought to “naturalize a normative family
in which only enduringly monogamous heterosexual couples reproduce.”4
Today, however, the “traditional” nuclear family consisting of a married
different-sex couple and their genetic children represents only a minority
of family structures in the United States, and a significant number of children have more than two individuals in their lives who serve in a parental
role.5 For example, the rate of births outside of marriage and the rate of
divorce each remain around 40% or higher.6 As a result, stepparents,
non-marital partners of legal parents, and extended family members
often play significant roles in children’s lives and may form relationships
with children that are parental in nature.7 Moreover, it has become increasingly common for same-sex couples to have children, and some
same-sex couples have chosen to create family structures in which the
couple and a third party whose gametes were used to conceive the child
(and perhaps the gamete provider’s spouse or partner) raise the child together as co-parents.8
1. See infra Section III.B.
2. See infra Section III.B.
3. Elizabeth Marquardt, Opinion, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/opinion/16marquardt.html [https://perma.cc/
GX3G-GP9V] (coining the term “the rule of two”).
4. Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 21
(2008).
5. PEW RSCH. CTR., PARENTING IN AMERICA 2–3, 8 (2015), https://
www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today [https://
perma.cc/4MP3-WHWD].
6. Joyce A. Martin, Brady E. Hamilton, Michelle J.K. Osterman & Anne K. Driscoll,
Births: Final Data for 2019, 70 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS. 1, 6 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr70/nvsr70-02-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CWZ-5J43] (describing the rate
of births outside of marriage); John Harrington & Cheyenne Buckingham, Broken Hearts:
A Rundown of the Divorce Capital of Every State, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2018/02/02/broken-hearts-rundown-divorce-capital-every-state/1078283001 [https://perma.cc/E582-MGWN] (describing the divorce rate).
7. Tiffany L. Palmer, How Many Parents?, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 36, 36 (2018).
8. Stu Marvel, The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Applying Vulnerability Theory to
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 2047, 2058–59 (2015); Palmer, supra
note 7, at 36.
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Important medical advancements have also contributed to the decline
of the rule of two. The use of assisted reproductive technology (ART) has
become increasingly common among both same-sex couples who wish to
conceive children and different-sex couples who are confronting fertility
issues.9 Advancements in ART mean that five or more people may be
directly involved in the conception of a child: the providers of the gametes used to conceive the child, the person who gestates the child, and
the intended parents.10 Moreover, it is likely that advances in medical
technology will soon result in the ability to conceive children using the
gametes of three individuals, leading to the reality of a child having more
than two genetic parents.11
Along with these societal and medical developments have come important legal developments. The law has both expanded the categories of
individuals who can utilize the traditional mechanisms available for parentage establishment (marriage, adoption, and biology) and added important additional parentage establishment mechanisms. Members of
same-sex couples, for example, now can use traditional marriage-based
avenues—such as the marital presumption of parentage, spousal consent
to assisted reproduction laws, and stepparent adoption procedures—to
obtain legal parentage.12 In addition, states across the country have supplemented their traditional parentage establishment mechanisms with a
variety of intent- and function-based mechanisms, meaning that there are
more bases on which an individual may establish legal parentage than
ever before.13 Taken together, these societal, medical, and legal developments have led to a situation in which it is increasingly common for more
than two people to seek recognition as a child’s legal parent.14
Rather than joining the well-developed debate regarding the baseline
question of whether the law should recognize the possibility of a child
having more than two legal parents,15 this Article instead seeks to address
what boundaries the law should adopt in setting forth a logical, fair, and
effective legal framework governing multi-parentage determinations. Le9. Marvel, supra note 8, at 2058–59; Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood,
126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2285–86 (2017).
10. See Marvel, supra note 8, at 2058–59.
11. Judith Daar, Multi-Party Parenting in Genetics and Law: A View from Succession,
49 FAM. L.Q. 71, 71 (2015).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Myrisha S. Lewis, Biology, Genetics, Nurture, and the Law: The Expansion of the
Legal Definition of Family to Include Three or More Parents, 16 NEV. L.J. 743, 744–45
(2016).
15. See generally Appleton, supra note 4; Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649 (2008); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007); Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy and
Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted Reproductive Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parenting, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 175 (2018).
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gal recognition of multi-parentage is a relatively new concept.16 The jurisdictions that have recognized multi-parentage through statute or court
decision have employed varying approaches, and the boundaries of multiparentage recognition remain very much unsettled. Of particular importance are questions relating to (1) whether the consent of all the existing
legal parents should be required for the law to recognize additional legal
parents and, if so, whether the definition of consent should encompass
both express and implied consent; (2) what (if any) cap states should set
on the number of individuals who can obtain legal parentage; and (3) how
to structure multi-parentage laws in a way that avoids imposing a heteroand bio-normative family structure on LGBTQ+ families.17 Each of these
questions raises complex legal and policy-related issues.
The first question, regarding the consent of a child’s existing legal parents to the establishment of multi-parentage, raises complicated legal issues. The analysis necessarily involves weighing the fundamental
constitutional rights of the existing legal parents to direct the care, custody, and control of their child against the state’s interest in protecting
the well-being of children who have formed a parent-like relationship
with a third party. With regard to the second question, whether states
should set a firm cap on the number of parents the law can recognize,
there are strong policy considerations on each side. On the one hand,
having too many individuals recognized as a child’s legal parents could
lead to chaos and conflict that is detrimental to the child. On the other
hand, having the state choose one number as the absolute maximum
number of legal parents a child could possibly have is arguably arbitrary
and unwise given the wide variety of family forms in existence today and
the unique attributes of every family. Resolving the third question, how
to protect LGBTQ+ families from imposition of a hetero- and bio-normative family structure, will be a complex undertaking that will require
states to carefully construct each component of their laws in a way that
minimizes the potential for anti-LGBTQ bias to play a determinative role
in multi-parentage decisions. Overall, in structuring their multi-parentage
laws, it is essential that states give each of these questions thorough consideration—the manner in which states choose to address these questions
will have profound and lasting effects on children, parents, and families.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part II describes each of
the modern bases through which individuals can establish legal parentage. Part III begins by identifying the common factual scenarios in which
multi-parentage issues may arise. It then sets forth a detailed description
of the current state of the law governing multi-parentage in the United
States. Part IV identifies three of the most important unsettled questions
regarding how states should structure the boundaries of multi-parentage
16. Appleton, supra note 4, at 12–13 (explaining that the issue of “whether particular
children can or should have more than two parents, surfaced with seeming suddenness” in
2007).
17. As per Professor Katharine K. Baker, the term bionormative in this context refers
to “a parental regime based on biology.” Baker, supra note 15, at 653.
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recognition. After engaging in a thorough analysis of the legal and policyrelated issues underlying each question, the Article sets forth a number of
detailed proposals regarding how states should address each of these critical questions.
II. MODERN BASES FOR PARENTAGE ESTABLISHMENT
A. THE ACT

OF

GIVING BIRTH

The law has long provided legal parentage based upon the act of giving
birth,18 and that remains largely true today. At present, the only scenario
in which legal parentage does not attach to the act of giving birth is when
state law recognizes a surrogacy agreement as establishing the intended
parents as the child’s sole legal parents prior to or upon the child’s
birth.19 In the absence of an enforceable surrogacy agreement, the law
widely continues to provide legal parentage based upon the act of giving
birth.20 This longstanding practice not only reflects a recognition of the
critically important, substantial caregiving work and nurturing undertaken by individuals who gestate and give birth to children, but it also
bestows parentage to an individual who, in addition to gestating the child,
is the child’s genetic and intended parent in the vast majority of
instances.21
B. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION
The longstanding marital presumption of parentage is the most common way of establishing legal parentage in someone other than the person who gave birth.22 “As far back as the early 1700s, the common law of
England set forth a presumption that a woman’s husband was the legal
father of any child born to or conceived by the woman during the marriage.”23 In the early years of the United States, the marital presumption
was virtually irrefutable.24 Rebutting the presumption required the initiation of legal proceedings in which the husband or wife had to prove that
“the husband did not have access to his wife”25 during the time of conception, and neither the wife nor the husband was permitted to testify to
this fact.26
18. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 125, 127 (2006).
19. See NeJaime, supra note 9, at 2264, 2300, 2334.
20. See id. at 2280.
21. Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments
of Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 115 (2018).
22. Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1647, 1659 (2015).
23. Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for the Modern
Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 248 (2019) (citing Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562
(2000)).
24. Id. at 248–49.
25. Glennon, supra note 23, at 562–63.
26. Feinberg, supra note 23, at 248–49.

2022]

Boundaries of Multi-Parentage

313

While the marital presumption remains in some form in every state, the
rules governing the presumption have changed over the years.27 The
spouses are no longer prohibited from testifying in rebuttal actions.28 In
addition, in approximately two-thirds of states, not only do the person
who gave birth, their spouse, and child support enforcement agencies
have standing to challenge the marital presumption, but an individual
outside of the marriage who claims to be the child’s biological father also
may seek to rebut the presumption.29 Rebuttal usually requires, at a minimum, DNA testing results indicating that the spouse of the person who
gave birth does not share a genetic connection with the child.30 In many
states, however, courts can refuse to admit DNA evidence or otherwise
deny rebuttal if the court determines that rebuttal would be contrary to
the child’s best interests or that the party seeking to rebut the marital
presumption should be estopped from doing so on equitable grounds.31
Importantly, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, which mandated that states provide marriage rights
to same-sex couples on the same terms accorded to different-sex couples,
it seems clear that state marital presumption laws must extend to samesex spouses of individuals who give birth.32 The Supreme Court’s decision
two years later in Pavan v. Smith, which held that if a state provides the
different-sex spouses of individuals who give birth with the right to be
listed on the child’s birth certificate it must do the same for same-sex
spouses, further supports the mandatory application of state marital presumption laws to same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth.33 The
vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue have reached the
conclusion that state marital presumptions, even if written in gendered
terms, apply equally to same-sex spouses.34 In addition, a number of
states have amended their marital presumption laws so that gender-neutral terms are used to describe the spouse of the individual who gave
birth.35
C. VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

OF

PARENTAGE

Today, voluntary acknowledgements of parentage (VAPs), which are
usually executed at the hospital at the time of the child’s birth,36 are the
most common way of establishing a second legal parent for a child born
27. Id. at 252.
28. Id. at 249.
29. Id. at 252.
30. Id. For an argument regarding the need to change the bases for rebuttal given the
application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples, see generally id.
31. Id. at 252–53.
32. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 652, 681 (2015).
33. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per curiam).
34. Feinberg, supra note 23, at 255–56 n.57.
35. NeJaime, supra note 9, at 2339.
36. Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 920 (2006).
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to an unmarried individual.37 Federal guidelines mandate that all birthing
hospitals and birth records offices provide “a simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity” of children who are “born out-of-wedlock.”38 To establish a party’s parentage through a VAP, the individual
who gave birth and the person whose parentage the parties are seeking to
establish must sign a document acknowledging that person’s parentage.39
Importantly, while many states’ VAP forms or accompanying instructions
state that in signing the VAP the parties are attesting under penalty of
perjury that, to the best of their knowledge, the party seeking to establish
parentage is the child’s biological father,40 states cannot require a person
to submit to genetic testing before signing a VAP.41 As a result, a biological tie between the individual seeking to establish parentage and the child
does not need to be proven in order for legal parentage to be established
through the VAP. An unrescinded VAP must be “considered a legal finding of paternity,”42 and states must give “full faith and credit” to VAPs
validly executed in other states.43 Although federal law only requires
states to provide VAPs to establish the paternity of children born “out-ofwedlock,”44 approximately half of states allow a married individual who
gives birth to execute a VAP with someone other than their spouse if the
spouse is willing to execute a document declaring that they are not the
child’s biological father and waiving their presumed legal parentage.45
37. Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex
Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 469 (2012).
38. 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(5)(iii) (2017). Federal law mandates only voluntary paternity
establishment procedures, and thus this Article uses the term paternity, as opposed to parentage, in describing the federal rules. 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1)(i)–(ii) (2017). Otherwise,
however, because a number of states have extended these procedures to parentage establishment for women and non-binary individuals, see infra notes 49–50 and accompanying
text, this Article uses the term voluntary acknowledgement of parentage.
39. 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(4) (2017).
40. Baker, supra note 22, at 1686.
41. Harris, supra note 37, at 476 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 302.70(a)(5)(vii) (2009)).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
43. Id. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
45. See, e.g., Self-Help Center: Family Law, ALASKA CT. SYS., http://
www.courts.alaska.gov/shc/family/glossary.htm#aff-pat [https://perma.cc/N565-CJJ7]; Acknowledgement of Paternity, ARIZ. DEP’T ECON. SEC., http://www.azdhs.gov/documents/
licensing/vital-records/register-acknowledgement-paternity.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL279J2Y]; Acknowledgement of Paternity, ARK. OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, http://
www.dfa.arkansas.gov/offices/childSupport/Documents/aopPage1English.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A8KK-6BRH]; Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity, STATE OF COLO.,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CHED_VR_Form_Acknowledgementof-Paternity_English0916.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PBK-6SH4]; Form No. VS27-A, Acknowledgement of Paternity (AOP), ME. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/public-health-systems/data-research/vital-records/documents/
pdf-files/VS27-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/H66L-XPAU]; Minnesota Voluntary Recognition of
Parentage, MINN. DEP’T HUM. SERVS., https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Public/DHS3159-ENG [https://perma.cc/5Y5R-DTAT]; Paternity Issues, CLARK CNTY. NEV., https://
www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/departments/district_attorney/divisions/family_support_division/paternity_issues1.php [https://perma.cc/S3RH-6Y5D]; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 5-C:24 (2015); North Dakota Acknowledgment of Paternity, N.D. DEP’T
HEALTH, https://childsupport.dhs.nd.gov/sites/default/files/PDFs/acknowledgment-of-paternity.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VRA-RPPV]; OKLA. HUM. SERVS., Paternity Establishment
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While either signatory may rescind the VAP within sixty days of its
execution, after that point it can be challenged only on the grounds of
duress, material mistake of fact, or fraud.46 Although the most frequent
challenges to VAPs are based upon claims “that the [person who gave
birth] committed fraud by misleading the man about his biological paternity or that there is a material mistake of fact because the man is not the
biological father,” proof that the man is not the child’s biological father
will not necessarily result in the disestablishment of his parentage.47
Some courts require evidence of fraud or mistake in addition to the genetic testing results or deny the challenge, despite the genetic testing results, where disestablishing the paternity of the man who executed the
VAP would be inequitable under the circumstances or contrary to the
best interests of the child.48
While the federal guidelines set out voluntary acknowledgement procedures that extend only to establishing parentage for men, approximately
ten states have expanded voluntary acknowledgement procedures to women and non-binary individuals as of 2021.49 Many of these states have
adopted an approach similar to that adopted by the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which extends VAP availability to women and non-binary individuals who qualify under the Act as intended or presumed
parents as long as there is no other individual who is already recognized
under the Act as the child’s second legal parent.50 The Act maintains the
sixty-day rescission period and limited grounds for challenges following
the rescission period.51
Process, https://oklahoma.gov/okdhs/library/policy/current/oac-340/chapter-25/subchapter5/parts-21/establishment-of-parentage.html [https://perma.cc/X63P-J6XS]; R.I. GEN. LAW
§ 15-8-3 (2020); Voluntary Declaration of Paternity: What You Should Know, UTAH DEP’T
HEALTH, http://www.paternitymatters.utah.gov/pdf/XNOT.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXZ9AJVN]; Acknowledgement of Parentage, WASH. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.doh.wa.
gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/422-159-AcknowledgmentOfParentage.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7ST9-42V4]; Paternity Establishment on the Birth Certificate, WYO. DEP’T
HEALTH, https://health.wyo.gov/admin/vitalstatistics/paternityestablishment [https://perma.
cc/2F6G-ZEL6]. At the other end of the spectrum, a number of state VAP forms specify
that VAP procedures are unavailable when a child is born to a married mother. Feinberg,
supra note 21, at 128–29.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii), (iii).
47. Harris, supra note 37, at 479–81.
48. Id. at 480–82.
49. COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 5:22 (2021).
50. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 301, 302(b)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see, e.g., VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 301(a)(3)–(4) (2021) (including “a person who is an intended parent
to the child” and “a presumed parent” among the list of persons who may sign an acknowledgement of parentage). Under the UPA approach, if there is a presumed parent, the gestating parent can execute a VAP with someone else if the presumed parent executes a
denial of parentage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302(b)(1).
51. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 308(a)(1), 309(a). The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act requires that challenges to VAPs after the rescission period occur within two years from the
execution of the VAP. Id. § 309(a). State laws currently differ with regard to the categories
of individuals who have standing to challenge VAPs. Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful Parents:
Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. REV. 325, 351–53 (2019).
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D. GENETICS
Actual or presumed genetic ties to the child have long played a role in
parentage determinations.52 In situations where a child has only one existing legal parent, the person who gave birth, an individual claiming to
be the child’s biological father, or a child support agency can initiate legal
proceedings to establish the alleged biological father’s parentage on the
basis of DNA evidence.53 Federal law requires that state procedures “create a rebuttable or, at the option of the State, conclusive presumption of
paternity upon genetic testing results indicating a threshold probability
that the alleged father is the father of the child.”54
In situations in which a second individual (in addition to the person
who gave birth) is already recognized as a legal parent, an individual
claiming parentage on the basis of genetic ties to the child may be able to
bring an action to establish their parentage and rebut the parentage of
the existing second legal parent. For example, as discussed above, in twothirds of states biological fathers have standing to seek to rebut the marital presumption of parentage that attaches to the spouse of the individual
who gave birth.55 In addition, while the standing requirements for VAP
challenges differ by state, a biological father may have standing to challenge a VAP that identifies someone else as the child’s second legal parent.56 However, genetic ties are not always determinative in these
contexts. Courts may reject these challenges on the grounds that establishing the genetic father as the child’s legal parent would be contrary to
the best interests of the child or inequitable.57 Many jurisdictions also
have time limitations on actions to challenge an individual’s legal
parentage.58
Moreover, in recent years some jurisdictions have expanded to women
the types of genetics-based parentage establishment avenues traditionally
available only to men.59 This has arisen primarily in the context of gestational surrogacy arrangements in situations where the surrogacy agreement is not enforceable under the laws of the jurisdiction, but the court
allows the intended mother to establish parentage through proof that she
is the child’s genetic mother.60 In addition, a few courts have recognized
similar claims in the context of same-sex couples who engaged in reciprocal in vitro fertilization (IVF), an assisted reproductive procedure
52. Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody Disputes
Between Same-Sex Parents: Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331, 340–46 (2016).
53. Glennon, supra note 23 at 566, 569.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G).
55. See supra text accompanying note 29.
56. Parness, supra note 51, at 351–53.
57. See supra notes 31, 48 and accompanying text.
58. Feinberg, supra note 23, at 270 (discussing time limitations on marital presumption
challenges); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 309(a), 610(b)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (adopting a two-year time limitation on VAP challenges).
59. Jessica Feinberg, After Marriage Equality: Dual Fatherhood for Married Male
Same-Sex Couples, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1507, 1535–36 (2021).
60. Id. at 1535–37.
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wherein an embryo is created using ova from one member of the samesex couple and sperm from a third party and then transferred to the other
member of the couple for gestation.61 The courts in these cases recognized both members of the couple as the child’s legal parents—one on the
basis of giving birth and the other on the basis of genetic ties.62 Notably,
the trend in expanding genetics-based parentage grounds to women is
likely to continue as many states have adopted provisions in their parentage codes indicating that, to the extent reasonable, the standards governing paternity determinations should apply to maternity
determinations.63
E. CONSENT

TO

ASSISTED REPRODUCTION

Under existing statutory or common law rules throughout the United
States, a husband who consents to his wife’s use of assisted reproduction
with the intent to be the resulting child’s parent is deemed a legal parent
regardless of whether the child is conceived using the husband’s sperm or
donor sperm.64 In some jurisdictions, the laws require that the consent be
in writing or that the procedure be performed under the supervision of a
physician.65 Notably, parentage established through consent to assisted
reproduction laws generally is conclusive and irrefutable.66 In terms of
same-sex couples, courts that have addressed the issue generally have
ruled that, under Obergefell and Pavan, spousal consent to ART laws extend to same-sex spouses.67 In addition, a growing number of states are
adopting spousal consent to ART statutes that contain gender-neutral
terms in reference to the class of individuals who may use this avenue to
establish their legal parentage.68
A number of jurisdictions now have consent to ART laws that extend
to non-marital partners. As of 2021, approximately sixteen jurisdictions
have adopted consent to ART laws that extend to an individual who consents to a non-marital partner’s use of ART to conceive with the intent to
be the resulting child’s parent.69 In thirteen of these jurisdictions, the law
61. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 3:11; Reciprocal IVF, UNIV. S.
CAL. FERTILITY, https://uscfertility.org/same-sex-family-building/reciprocal-ivf [https://
perma.cc/JFH2-ALLY].
62. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005) (holding that where a samesex couple had engaged in recipricol IVF, each member of the couple had an equal claim
to legal parentage).
63. NeJaime, supra note 9, at 2294–95.
64. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 3:3.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 3:4.
67. Id.; see, e.g., Appel v. Celia, No. CL-2017-0011789 at *2–3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 8,
2018) (extending a Virginia statute that “confers upon the husband of a gestational [parent] who conceives a child through assisted conception the right of parentage” to same-sex
spouses of gestational parents because “the reasoning in Obergefell and Pavan make clear
that [limiting the statute’s application to different-sex couples] does not comply with constitutional requirements”).
68. NeJaime, supra note 9, app. A (listing twelve gender-neutral donor insemination
statutes).
69. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 3:3.
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encompasses non-marital same-sex partners.70 Similar to the spousal consent to ART laws discussed above, a conclusive presumption of parentage
generally attaches under these laws to the individual who consents to a
non-marital partner’s use of ART.71
F. SURROGACY
Surrogacy typically involves an agreement between the surrogate and
intended parents providing that the surrogate agrees to become pregnant
through the use of assisted reproduction and to relinquish parental rights
to any resulting child to the intended parents.72 Only a few jurisdictions
statutorily recognize “traditional” or “genetic” surrogacy agreements in
which the surrogate’s ova and sperm from an intended parent donor are
used to conceive the child73 (meaning the surrogate shares both genetic
and gestational ties to the child).74 The other category of surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, is estimated to represent approximately 95% of all
surrogacy arrangements today.75 In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is
not genetically connected to the child—ova and sperm from the intended
parent(s) or gamete donor(s) are used to create the embryo that will be
implanted in the surrogate.76
Gestational surrogacy is a complex area of the law and legal regulation
varies dramatically by jurisdiction. Slightly under half of states have statutes that explicitly address gestational surrogacy,77 some states have only
case law addressing gestational surrogacy,78 and still other states have no
statutory or case law governing gestational surrogacy.79 A few of the
states with statutes addressing surrogacy consider all surrogacy contracts
void and unenforceable.80 The rest of the jurisdictions with statutes addressing gestational surrogacy, approximately eighteen jurisdictions, rec70. Id.
71. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (West 2021)) (“A person who provides
eggs, sperm or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction . . . with the intent to be
the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child.”).
72. Jenna Casolo, Campbell Curry-Ledbetter, Meagan Edmonds, Gabrielle Field,
Kathleen O’Neill & Marisa Poncia, Twentieth Annual Review of Gender and the Law: Annual Review Article: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 313, 329
(2019); JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 4.1.
73. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 4:2.
74. Id., § 4.1.
75. Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 32, 33 (2011).
76. ROBERT JOHN KANE & LAWRENCE E. SINGER, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
IN ILLINOIS § 35:9 (3d ed. 2019).
77. See NeJaime, supra note 9, app. E.
78. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 4.3.
79. Id. § 4.5.
80. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2021) (stating that “it is against public
policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate
to . . . become pregnant . . . [or w]aive parental rights or duties to a child”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2021) (“A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2021) (“Any agreement
in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish that woman’s rights and
duties as a parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is void.”).

2022]

Boundaries of Multi-Parentage

319

ognize surrogacy agreements under specified conditions.81 In states that
recognize the enforceability of at least some gestational surrogacy agreements, the approaches to the categories of individuals who may enter into
enforceable surrogacy agreements as intended parents range from permissive jurisdictions that place no marriage- or genetics-related restrictions on intended parents to restrictive jurisdictions in which eligibility is
limited to very narrow categories of intended parents.82
In a number of the jurisdictions that recognize gestational surrogacy
agreements, courts can grant pre-birth parentage orders that identify the
intended parents as the child’s legal parents before the child is born.83 In
a few of the jurisdictions that recognize gestational surrogacy agreements,
the intended parents must wait until the child is born to obtain an order
establishing their legal parentage.84 On the other end of the spectrum, a
few states’ gestational surrogacy statutes establish legal parentage for intended parents who enter into a valid surrogacy agreement without any
requirement of judicial involvement.85
G. ADOPTION
All states allow for the establishment of legal parentage through judicial adoption proceedings.86 Most adoptions fall into one of three categories: (1) “[t]he adoption of children from the public foster care system by
foster caregivers, kin, or adoptive parents chosen by the agency for the
child”; (2) “[t]he domestic adoption of infants who reside in the United
States and are adopted through private adoption agencies or independently”; or (3) “[i]ntercountry adoption of infants and children from
other countries by U.S. citizens.”87 In terms of the categories of individuals eligible to adopt children, the laws of all jurisdictions permit married
couples to jointly adopt children.88 After Obergefell, these laws must be
applied equally to married same-sex couples.89 In addition, single individuals are eligible to adopt in all jurisdictions, and a number of jurisdictions
81. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 4:2.
82. The United States Surrogacy Law Map, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS (2016),
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map [https://perma.cc/A556TEHR] (describing the laws governing surrogacy agreements in every state).
83. Id. There are approximately eleven states in which “[s]urrogacy is permitted for all
parents, pre-birth orders are granted throughout the state, and both parents will be named
on the birth certificate.” Id.; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 581-203(d) (McKinney 2021) (coming
into effect on February 15, 2021, after the Creative Family Map was last updated).
84. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 4:8.
85. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(b) (West 2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A, § 1933(1) (2021); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(c) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
86. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COURT
JURISDICTION AND VENUE FOR ADOPTION PETITIONS 1 (2017), https://
www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/A24N-3DX7].
87. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE
BASICS OF ADOPTION PRACTICE 2 (2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
f_basicsbulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYP2-VHX4].
88. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:11.
89. Id.
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also allow unmarried couples to jointly adopt children.90 A few states exclude certain categories of individuals, such as unmarried couples or individuals who are cohabitating with a non-marital partner, from adoption
eligibility.91 For most types of adoptions, the parental status of any existing legal parents has to be terminated before the adoptive parent(s)
can obtain legal parentage.92 There are, however, a couple of common
exceptions to this general rule.
Step- and second-parent adoption procedures allow an existing legal
parent to maintain their status as the child’s legal parent when their
spouse or non-marital partner adopts the child.93 Stepparent adoption
procedures, in which the spouse of an existing legal parent adopts the
child, are available in every jurisdiction.94 Following Obergefell, both different- and same-sex spouses of a child’s legal parent can utilize stepparent adoptions to establish parentage.95 Second-parent adoption, which is
recognized in a minority of jurisdictions, allows the non-marital partner
of a child’s existing legal parent to adopt the child.96 As of 2021, approximately sixteen jurisdictions have statutes or appellate case law providing
for second-parent adoptions; a number of additional jurisdictions have
allowed second-parent adoptions in at least some counties.97 It is important to note that for both step- and second-parent adoptions, if the child
already has an existing second legal parent the adoption generally cannot
occur unless that person’s parental rights are terminated (either voluntarily or involuntarily).98
H. PARENTAL FUNCTIONING
Over the past fifty years or so, parental functioning has emerged as a
basis for the establishment of legal parentage. Common function-based
mechanisms for establishing parental rights include holding out provisions and equitable parenthood doctrines. Holding out provisions, which
were rooted originally in the gendered language of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, generally create a presumption of parentage for a man who
receives a child into his home and holds the child out as his own.99 Many
90. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 4
(2019), https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_
LGBT_Families.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9VB-XY24].
91. E.g., JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:11.
92. 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION
CASES § 14:1 (2020).
93. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., ADOPTION BY LGBT PARENTS 1 (2020), https://
www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2PA_state_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYR5JKDG].
94. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., supra note 93, at 1–2.
98. Feinberg, supra note 21, at 110, 112.
99. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:22 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973)).
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states have adopted holding out provisions.100 In some states, the holding
out provision contains a durational requirement mandating that the holding out occurred for a minimum amount of time following the child’s
birth.101 Common factors that courts consider in determining whether
someone has held the child out as their own include, inter alia, the person’s words and actions acknowledging the child as their own, the person’s demonstrated commitment to the child through physical, emotional,
and financial support, and whether the person and child share a bond that
is parental in nature.102 Courts in at least six states have held that such
provisions, even when written in gendered terms, extend to women who
have received the child into their home and held the child out as their
own for the requisite period of time.103 Notably, the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, which as of 2021 has been enacted in several states,104 sets
forth a holding out presumption that is written in gender-neutral
terms.105
Equitable parenthood doctrines—which are commonly referred to as
de facto, psychological, or functional parenthood doctrines—developed
as a method of providing rights relating to child custody and visitation to
individuals who had functioned in a parental role to a child but had not
attained formal legal parent status.106 The development of these doctrines
was particularly important for non-biological parents in same-sex relationships who were raising children together with the child’s biological
parent.107 For most of the nation’s history, non-biological parents in this
situation were excluded from formal mechanisms of establishing legal
parentage, which required biological ties, adoption, or marriage.108 Prior
to the establishment of equitable parenthood doctrines, if the relationship
between the non-biological parent and the biological parent ended and
the biological parent denied the non-biological parent access to the child,
the non-biological parent often was treated as a legal stranger in custody
and visitation actions.109 This resulted in the severance of relationships
between children and individuals who, in many cases, had functioned as
the child’s parent from the child’s birth.110
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 286 (N.M. 2012); Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117
P.3d 660, 667–70 (Cal. 2005); E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012);
160 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts § 5 (2017).
103. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:22.
104. Parentage Act Legislative Bill Tracking, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=C4f37d2d-4d204be0-8256-22dd73af068f [https://perma.cc/F6BK-STPN].
105. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
106. Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?: Revisiting Equitable Parenthood
Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent
Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 56 (2017).
107. Id. at 55.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 55–56.
110. Id. at 56.
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Equitable parenthood doctrines seek to promote children’s well-being
by protecting the relationship between a child and an individual who the
child views as a parent.111 The most widely adopted test for determining
whether an individual qualifies for relief under a state’s equitable
parenthood doctrine requires the petitioner to prove that: (1) the legal
parent consented to, supported, or fostered the formation of a parent-like
relationship between the petitioner and child; (2) the petitioner lived in a
household with the child; (3) the petitioner “assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support,
without expectation of financial compensation”; and (4) the petitioner
served in the role of a parent for long enough “to have established with
the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.”112
Today, a majority of states have adopted equitable parenthood doctrines through statute or case law.113 In most of the jurisdictions that have
adopted an equitable parenthood doctrine, an individual who qualifies as
an equitable parent is entitled to certain rights relating to child custody or
visitation, but is not recognized as a legal parent.114 More specifically,
qualifying individuals are given standing to seek custody or visitation, but
they “must meet higher burdens (the language of which differ[s] by jurisdiction) than legal parent[s] in order to obtain such rights.”115 In a few
jurisdictions, individuals who qualify under these doctrines are treated as
equal to legal parents for purposes of custody or visitation determinations, but they do not acquire the status of legal parent.116
Importantly, however, in recent years a handful of jurisdictions have
passed laws providing that satisfaction of the state’s equitable parenthood
doctrine is a basis for establishing full legal parentage. As of 2021, five
states—Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, Washington, and Delaware—have
enacted legislation allowing for the establishment of legal parentage
through equitable parentage doctrines.117 The standards for proving equi111. Id. at 56–57, 64–66.
112. Id. at 69 n.83 (quoting Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421
(Wis. 1995)); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (identifying as
the elements of the de facto parentage doctrine “that: (1) the individual resided with the
child as a regular member of the child’s household for a significant period; (2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; (3) the individual undertook full and
permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation; (4) the individual held out the child as the individual’s child; (5) the individual
established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature;
(6) another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship required under paragraph (5); and (7) continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is in the best interest of the child”).
113. De Facto Parenting Statutes, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://
www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/de_facto_parenting_statutes [https://perma.cc/ZP8R4KXD].
114. Id.
115. Feinberg, supra note 106, at 68 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 67–68.
117. H.B. 6321 § 38(a), 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 1891(4)(B) (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1) (West 2021); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440(4) (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(4)
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table parenthood in these jurisdictions are similar to the common standard described above, though some of these jurisdictions have added a
requirement that the petitioner held the child out as their own or made
explicit that the court must find that continuing the relationship between
the petitioner and child is in the child’s best interests.118 The core distinction between these five jurisdictions and the other jurisdictions that recognize equitable parenthood doctrines is that in these jurisdictions an
individual who meets the elements of the equitable parenthood doctrine
attains the status of legal parent.
III. MULTI-PARENTAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
The expansion of the methods through which parentage can be established, combined with advancements in reproductive technology and the
diversity in U.S. family structures, have made it increasingly difficult for
society and the legal system to deny the possibility of multi-parentage
recognition. This Part first describes a number of the more common scenarios in which multi-parentage issues may arise. It then provides a detailed overview of the current state of legal recognition of multiparentage in the United States.
A. SITUATIONS

IN

WHICH MULTI-PARENTAGE ISSUES MAY ARISE

1. Assisted Reproduction
Due to advancements in ART, a number of individuals may be involved in a child’s conception or birth. This may include, for example, the
providers of the gametes used to conceive the child, the person who gestates the child, and the intended parents. Same-sex couples who utilize
ART are particularly likely to require the involvement of third parties.
This is because cisgender same-sex couples who desire to have a child
who is genetically related to one member of the couple necessarily require gametes from a third party.119 Cisgender male same-sex couples
also require the assistance of a surrogate.120 Different-sex couples who
are facing fertility issues also may require gametes from a third party or
(West 2021). It is unclear whether Washington, D.C. also falls within this category of states.
This is because “[t]he statute declares [only] that a de facto parent ‘shall be deemed a
parent for purposes’ of a number of provisions that relate to child custody and child support; it is therefore unclear what the status means in other contexts.” JOSLIN, MINTER &
SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:22 n.68 (quoting D.C. CODE § 16-831.03(b) (2021)).
118. See ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1891(3)(E) (2021) (including as an element that “[t]he
continuing relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the
child”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1)(D), (G) (West 2021) (including as elements
that the petitioner held the child out as their own and that continuing the relationship is in
the best interests of the child); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440(4)(d), (g) (West
2021) (same); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (same). Connecticut
also has added a minimum time length to the element requiring that the petitioner resided
with the child, stating that the petitioner must have resided with the child for at least one
year “unless the court finds good cause to accept a shorter period.” H.B. 6321 § 38(a)(1),
2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021).
119. Feinberg, supra note 21, at 123–24.
120. Id. at 134.
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the assistance of a surrogate.121
The judicial system may become involved if, for example, the parties
involved in the child’s conception and birth agreed to a multi-parentage
arrangement and together request that more than two individuals be recognized as the child’s legal parents.122 More common, however, is for
courts to become involved when the relationship among some or all of
the parties deteriorates and multiple parties claim legal parentage.123 For
instance, the members of a same-sex couple and the third party who provided gametes or gestated the child may disagree as to whether the parties intended for the third party to be a parent, a donor or surrogate with
no claim to legal parentage, or something in-between.124 Each party may
assert an independent basis for establishing legal parentage. Moreover, if
the parties did not comply with the relevant requirements governing the
creation of enforceable gamete donation or surrogacy agreements, or if
the jurisdiction does not recognize the validity of such agreements, then
multi-parentage issues may arise regardless of the parties’ intent or
agreement.125
When multi-parentage issues arise in jurisdictions with laws that do not
recognize multi-parentage, the court must first determine which of the
parties have a valid basis for asserting legal parentage.126 Then, if more
than two individuals have bases for parentage establishment, the court
must determine which two should be deemed the child’s legal parents. If
121. See, e.g., Maria Cramer, Couple Forced to Adopt Their Own Children After a Surrogate Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/
michigan-surrogacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/4YUC-2CCK].
122. A.A. v. B.B. (2007), 83 O.R. 3d 561, 563–65 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (ruling on a parentage action brought by the members of a same-sex couples and the sperm provider, who
mutually sought recognition as the child’s three legal parents).
123. See infra Section IV.C.
124. See infra, notes 348–350 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596, 597, 600–01
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that because Indiana does not allow the person who gives
birth to disestablish maternity unless another individual establishes genetic maternity, the
surrogate’s parentage could not be disestablished even though the intended parents, the
surrogate, and the surrogate’s husband all remained in agreement that the surrogate
should not be recognized as the child’s legal parent); Cramer, supra note 121 (describing a
case in Michigan, which does not recognize surrogacy agreements, where the court denied
the intended parents’ request to be declared the legal parents of a child born via gestational surrogacy and held that despite the fact that all parties remained in agreement that
the intended parents should be recognized as the child’s legal parents, the intended parents
(who were also the child’s biological parents) would have to pursue adoption in order to
establish their parentage and disestablish the parentage of the surrogate and her husband);
Chandrika Narayan, Kansas Court Says Sperm Donor Must Pay Child Support, CNN (Jan.
24, 2014, 2:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/justice/kansas-sperm-donation/index.html [https://perma.cc/WA3C-HL5V] (describing a Kansas case in which the state was
allowed to establish the sperm donor’s paternity for purposes of obtaining child support,
despite the parties’ agreement that he was a donor with no parental rights, due to lack of
the required physician involvement under state’s donor non-paternity law).
126. See D.G. v. K.S., 133 A.3d 703, 710, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2015) (holding, in
a case involving a tri-parenting relationship between a male same-sex couple and their
female friend who had given birth to the child, that only the individual who gave birth and
the member of the same-sex couple who shared genetic ties with the child had grounds to
establish legal parentage).
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the dispute involves a challenge to the marital presumption or a VAP, the
court will apply the relevant standards governing such challenges discussed above.127 In situations involving other competing claims for parentage, the court usually bases its determination on considerations of
policy, logic, and the best interests of the child.128
2. Biological Fathers and Individuals with Competing Claims of Legal
Parentage
Outside of the assisted reproduction context, multi-parentage issues
also may arise when a biological father and another individual each seek
recognition as the child’s second legal parent. For example, a biological
father may seek to establish parentage, on genetics-based grounds, of a
child born to an individual who was married to someone else at the time
of the child’s conception or birth. In response, the spouse may claim legal
parentage based on the marital presumption. In jurisdictions that do not
recognize multi-parentage, either the spouse or the biological father, but
not both, will be recognized as the child’s parent.129 This has been true
even where both parties have formed a relationship with the child.130 In
terms of the determination of which party will be recognized as the
child’s legal parent, as discussed above, approximately two-thirds of jurisdictions give the biological father standing to rebut the presumed parentage that attaches to the spouse pursuant to the marital presumption.131 In
many states, however, courts can refuse to admit DNA evidence or otherwise deny rebuttal if the court determines that rebuttal would be “contrary to the child’s best interests or that the party seeking to rebut the
marital presumption should be estopped from doing so on equitable
grounds.”132 As a general matter, “[c]ourts are quite reluctant to undercut the marital presumption when the [person who gave birth] and [their
spouse] have co-parented the child, the [spouse] has provided financial
and emotional support to the child, and the child has bonded with the
[spouse].”133
Multi-parentage issues can also arise when a biological father seeks to
establish parentage on genetics-based grounds, and a current or former
127. See supra text accompanying notes 28–31, 46–48.
128. See, e.g., Doherty v. Leon, 472 P.3d 531, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020) (describing
various states’ approaches in resolving competing parentage claims based upon considerations of policy, logic, and the child’s best interests); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613 (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2017) (setting forth a number of factors for courts to consider in adjudicating
competing claims for parentage, many of which relate to the best interests of the child);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (“If two or more presumptions
arise which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”).
129. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130–31 (1989) (plurality opinion);
N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 356 (Colo. 2000).
130. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130–31; N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 356.
131. See supra text accompanying note 29.
132. Feinberg, supra note 23, at 252–53 (footnote omitted).
133. Rhonda Wasserman, DOMA and the Happy Family: A Lesson in Irony, 41 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 275, 284 (2010).
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non-marital partner of the person who gave birth asserts a competing
claim for parentage. For example, as discussed above, a biological father
may have standing to challenge a VAP that identifies another individual
as the child’s second legal parent.134 However, there are limited grounds
for challenging VAPs, and courts may deny such challenges, despite DNA
evidence, where they determine that disestablishing the parentage of the
individual identified in the VAP would be contrary to the child’s best
interests or equitable principles.135 Competing claims may also arise between a biological father and an individual who has another basis for asserting parentage, such as a holding out provision.136 As noted above,
when these types of competing claims for parentage arise in jurisdictions
that do not recognize multi-parentage, the court generally will make the
determination of which party to recognize as the child’s second legal parent based on considerations of policy, logic, and the child’s best
interests.137
3. Remarriage or Re-Partnering by the Existing Legal Parents
Multi-parentage issues also arise when a child has two existing legal
parents, and one or both of them enter into a marriage or serious relationship with a third party—a common occurrence in the United
States.138 For example, it is estimated that approximately one-third of
children will live in a household with a stepparent at some point in their
childhood.139 Children often form important relationships that are parental in nature with the spouse or partner of an existing legal parent.140
These relationships may begin when the child is very young and continue
for years, and the child may view the individual in question as a parent
regardless of that person’s formal legal status.141
Individuals who, at some point after the child is born, enter into a relationship with one of the child’s existing legal parents and wish to establish
legal parentage, generally must pursue adoption.142 As discussed above,
134. See supra text accompanying note 56.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
136. See, e.g., J.W.S. v. E.M.S., No. CS11-01557, 2013 WL 6174814, at *4–5 (Del. Fam.
Ct. May 29, 2013).
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying note 5.
139. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 703 (5th ed. 2019). In the five states that provide
equitable parenthood doctrines as a mechanism for parentage establishment, a spouse or
partner of a child’s legal parent who meets the elements of the doctrine could potentially
establish legal parentage on that basis. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
140. BRIAN H. BIX, THE BOGEYMAN OF THREE (OR MORE) PARENTS 4 (Legal Stud.
Rsch. Paper Series Rsch. Paper No. 08-22 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1196562 [https://perma.cc/Z8MV-T9UJ] (“In a world where divorce
is relatively common and accepted, and remarriage of one or both parents far from rare,
children frequently grow up with three or four parental figures.”).
141. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.KENT L. REV. 9, 17–18 (2017).
142. Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 367–68
(2020).
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however, in jurisdictions that do not recognize multi-parentage, the
spouse or partner of a child’s legal parent cannot adopt the child unless
the other legal parent first agrees to terminate their parental rights or has
their rights terminated involuntarily, which usually requires clear and
convincing evidence that the person is unfit and has engaged in serious
abuse, neglect, or abandonment of the child.143 There generally is no option for a legal parent to agree to the other legal parent’s spouse or partner adopting the child while still keeping their own legal parentage
intact.144
4. Other Involved “Non-Parents”
Multi-parentage issues also may arise when a child has two legal parents, and someone who is neither the spouse nor partner of one the legal
parents acts in a parental role to the child. Family members or friends of a
child’s legal parents may take on a parental role in the child’s life, which
may involve co-parenting with one or both of the child’s existing legal
parents.145 While “kinship caregiving” occurs in all types of communities,
it is particularly common in many minority communities for “relatives
and close friends [to] play a critical role in caring for children.”146 Today,
one in twelve children live in a household that is maintained by a grandparent or other relative,147 and Black and Asian children are twice as
likely as White children to be living in this type of household.148
Adoption is often the only option through which a kinship caregiver
can establish parentage, and its availability in this context is extremely
limited.149 In states that do not recognize multi-parentage, kinship
caregivers cannot adopt a child who has two existing legal parents.150 In
addition, even if one of the existing legal parents agrees to terminate their
parental rights or has their rights terminated involuntarily, there often is
no mechanism akin to step- or second-parent adoption available to establish kinship caregivers as a child’s second legal parent alongside the re143. Phillip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757, 766 (1992);
Solangel Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology: Making the Case for Post-Adoption Contact,
37 CAP. U.L. REV. 321, 357–58 (2008).
144. NeJaime, supra note 142, at 367–68.
145. Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I a Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from
the Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 604,
606 (2010).
146. Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 343
(2012); see also Coupet, supra note 145, at 595 (“Kinship caregivers—a group disproportionately populated by persons of color, particularly black grandmothers—have historically
assumed parental roles, often together with a legal parent.”).
147. Coupet, supra note 145, at 603.
148. PEW RSCH. CTR., AT GRANDMOTHER’S HOUSE WE STAY: ONE-IN-TEN CHILDREN
ARE LIVING WITH A GRANDPARENT 8 (2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/09/grandparents_report_final_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K36U-MBB6].
149. Coupet, supra note 145, 609.
150. See id. at 653–54.
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maining legal parent.151 As a result, individuals in this category generally
cannot establish parentage unless the parental status of both of the child’s
legal parents is terminated.152
5. Multi-Party Romantic Relationships
Multi-parentage issues may also arise within romantic relationships involving more than two people. In some cases, more than two parties may
share a romantic relationship together and conceive the child with the
intention to raise the child as a family unit.153 Multi-parentage issues also
may arise in other forms of multi-partner relationships, including polygamous and polyamorous relationships in which multiple partners are involved, but not all of the partners share a romantic relationship with each
other.154 With the practice of consensual non-monogamy becoming more
common (current estimates are that one in five people have engaged in it
at some point),155 this is an area in which multi-parentage issues likely
will increase in the coming years.156
As a general matter, like in the other contexts, in jurisdictions that do
not recognize multi-parentage, the law will recognize, at most, two of the
individuals involved as the child’s legal parents. The most likely result in
these situations is that initial legal parentage will attach to the person
who gave birth and, where relevant, their spouse or the individual with
whom they executed a VAP.157 If more than one party has recognized
grounds for establishment as the child’s second legal parent, courts must
apply the relevant standards discussed above governing rebuttal of the
marital presumption, VAP challenges, or competing claims involving
other grounds for parentage establishment.158
6. Adoption and Foster Care
While a detailed discussion of the adoption and foster care systems is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to recognize this as another area in which multi-parentage issues arise. With regard to adoption,
151. See, e.g., In re Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2007).
152. Coupet, supra note 145, at 653. In the five states that provide equitable parenthood
doctrines as a mechanism for parentage establishment, a kinship caregiver who meets the
elements of the doctrine potentially could establish legal parentage on that basis. See supra
notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Dawn M. v. Michael M., 47 N.Y.S.3d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017).
154. Marvel, supra note 8, at 2085–86.
155. Jessica Stillman, 5 Lessons on Jealousy and Romance that Couples can Learn from
Their Friends in Non-Monogamous Relationships, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2020, 9:12 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.in/slideshows/miscellaneous/5-lessons-on-jealousy-and-romance-that-couples-can-learn-from-their-friends-in-non-monogamous-relationships/slidelist/74032288.cms#slideid=74032300 [https://perma.cc/LYQ9-UBLC].
156. See Marvel, supra note 8, at 2088 (“Complicated kinships are more likely to be the
future for both Canada and the United States, emerging both from polygamous and polyamorous communities, as well as the use of reproductive technologies outside a two-parent
model of kinship.”).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 22, 36–37.
158. See supra notes 26–31, 46–48, 128 and accompanying text.
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outside of the context of step- and second-parent adoptions, a child cannot be adopted unless the parental status of all of the child’s existing legal
parents is first terminated (either voluntarily or involuntarily).159 This exclusivity of legal parentage in the adoption context has remained in place
even as open adoption practices allowing for a child’s biological parents
to remain, to varying extents, involved in the child’s life have become
increasingly common.160 Similarly, for children in foster care, if the rights
of the child’s biological parents are not terminated, then the biological
parents are the only parties with the status of legal parent.161 The foster
parents, regardless of how long they have been serving in a parental role,
will not be recognized as legal parents unless and until the rights of the
existing legal parents are terminated, allowing the foster parents to pursue adoption.162
B. LEGAL RECOGNITION

OF

MULTI-PARENTAGE

While the “rule of two” remains in place in many jurisdictions, in recent years statutes and judicial decisions recognizing that a child can have
more than two legal parents in certain circumstances have increased significantly. As the discussion below demonstrates, there is a clear trend
toward states recognizing multi-parentage. This trend shows no signs of
slowing down, and legal recognition of multi-parentage likely will become
even more widespread in the coming years.163
1. Statutory Recognition
a. Louisiana
While Louisiana was the first state to recognize that a child may have
more than two legal parents,164 recognition is limited to very narrow circumstances. Beginning in the 1970s, Louisiana courts began to recognize
the possibility of dual paternity in situations where the husband of the
person who gave birth was presumed to be the child’s father pursuant to
the marital presumption, but another man was established as the child’s
biological father.165 The Louisiana Supreme Court first determined that
the biological father could be recognized as a legal parent for purposes of
a wrongful death action without the presumed father losing his parental
status.166 The Louisiana courts subsequently extended this ruling such
that a biological father could be recognized as the child’s legal parent for
child support purposes without the presumed father losing his parental
159. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV.
715, 719 n.11 (2015).
160. Id. at 718, 730–37.
161. Id. at 735–37.
162. Id.
163. See Quinn, supra note 15, at 180.
164. Rachel L. Kovach, Sorry Daddy—Your Time Is Up: Rebutting the Presumption of
Paternity in Louisiana, 56 LOY. L. REV. 651, 659 (2010).
165. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 141, at 20–21.
166. Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813, 817 (La. 1974).
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status.167
Revisions to the state’s filiation laws in 2005 resulted in the statutory
recognition of dual paternity.168 The concept of dual paternity is reflected
in, for example, statutory provisions that (1) allow the state to seek to
establish the paternity of the biological father for the purpose of obtaining child support despite the child already having a presumed father,
and (2) allow the child to establish the biological father’s paternity without displacing the presumed father’s legal parentage.169 While the biological father may be recognized as a legal parent for purposes of child
support, the Louisiana courts “have been reluctant to award custodial
rights to more than one father at a time, [and] have never treated three
parents as having equal physical and legal custodial rights with respect to
a child.”170 The courts in these cases generally have not considered the
biological father to be on equal footing with the presumed father.171
Overall, Louisiana’s recognition of multi-parentage is extremely limited—it applies only to situations involving married different-sex couples
wherein the husband is not the child’s biological father, and it seems to be
aimed primarily at identifying the biological father as a third parent solely
for child support purposes.172
b. Delaware
In Delaware, statutory recognition of multi-parentage occurs solely
through the state’s de facto parentage law.173 The de facto parentage statute was enacted in 2009.174 As noted above, Delaware is one of the states
in which an individual can establish legal parentage through satisfaction
167. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 848 (La. 1989).
168. Kovach, supra note 164, at 658–59.
169. LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:236.1.2(D)(1) (2021) (“The department, except when it is not
in the best interest of the child, may . . . take direct civil action, including actions to establish filiation against an alleged biological parent notwithstanding the existence of a legal
presumption that another person is the parent of the child solely for the purpose of fulfilling its responsibility under this Section.”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 197, 2005 cmt. b
(2021) (establishing the right of the child to establish paternity of the biological father
despite the existence of the presumed father, and noting that “Louisiana currently is the
only state which recognizes that a child may establish his filiation to more than one
father”).
170. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Custody and Visitation in Families with Three (or
More) Parents, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 399, 401 (2018).
171. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 141, at 21 (citing Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1197
(La. App. 1995)) (describing the one Louisiana dual paternity case the authors could find
in which both fathers received custodial rights, which involved a biological father who had
later married the child’s mother and wherein the husband received physical custody, but
the biological father was awarded shared legal custody and visitation akin to what the
mother was awarded); Jacqueline V. Gaines, The Legal Quicksand 2+ Parents: The Need
for a National Definition of a Legal Parent, 46 U. DAYTON L. REV. 105, 109 (2021)
(“Therefore, the biological father has financial responsibilities, but no attendant rights to
visitation and custody.”).
172. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 141, at 20–21.
173. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2021).
174. An Act to Amend Title 13 of the Delaware Code Relating to Parents, ch. 97, § 1,
2009 Delaware Laws (West).
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of the de facto parentage doctrine.175 Delaware’s de facto parentage standard requires as an element that the petitioner “had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who fostered the formation and
establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de
facto parent.”176 A number of Delaware courts have interpreted the language referring to the consent of the child’s existing legal “parents” as
indicating that multi-parentage can occur through satisfaction of the de
facto parentage doctrine.177
c. California
California was the first state to pass a law providing for broad recognition of multi-parentage. California’s multi-parentage law, enacted in
2013, states that “a court may find that more than two persons with a
claim to parentage . . . are parents if the court finds that recognizing only
two parents would be detrimental to the child.”178 The law then provides
guidance regarding what courts should consider in determining whether
recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. Specifically, it states that in determining potential detriment, “the court shall
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of
removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for
care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period
of time.”179 In addition to providing for multi-parentage in the context of
competing parentage claims, California law also explicitly provides for
the possibility of multi-parentage in the adoption context. The relevant
provision states that in adoption proceedings, the existing legal parent or
parents can maintain their legal parentage if the prospective adoptive
parent(s) and the existing legal parent(s) all sign a waiver prior to the
adoption being finalized.180
Importantly, the California bill establishing these multi-parentage provisions includes an introductory statement explaining that “[m]ost children have two parents, but in rare cases, children have more than two
people who are that child’s parent in every way” and further providing
that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that this bill will only apply in the
rare case where a child truly has more than two parents.”181 The courts,
175. Id. § 8-201(c).
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See, e.g., J.W.S. Jr. v. E.M.S., No. 11-08009, 2013 WL 6174814, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct.
May 29, 2013); A.L. v. D.L., No. 12-07390, 2012 WL 6765564, at *2–3 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept.
19, 2012); see also In re K.L.W., 492 P.3d 392, 398 (Colo. App. 2021) (interpreting Delaware’s de facto parentage law to provide for multi-parentage). But see Bancroft v. Jameson
(In re Bancroft), 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 15, 2010) (holding, in a decision that
other Delaware courts have not followed, that the Delaware de facto parentage law is
unconstitutional).
178. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2021).
179. Id.
180. Id. § 8617(b).
181. S.B. 274, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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in making multiple parentage determinations in contested cases, have
taken seriously the legislature’s expressed desire that multi-parentage
should only be recognized in the rare cases where a child has more than
two individuals who are, in every way, that child’s parents. In interpreting
the requirement that courts not recognize multi-parentage unless failing
to do so would be detrimental to the child, courts have required the party
seeking recognition to demonstrate that a relationship that is parental in
nature continues to exist between the party and the child at the time of
the parentage determination proceedings.182 This was demonstrated in a
series of cases involving biological fathers who satisfied the state’s holding out standard for establishing parentage and sought to establish parentage of a child who already had a mother and presumed father.183 The
courts in these cases reached different conclusions about whether to recognize the biological father as a third legal parent depending on whether
he shared a relationship with the child that was parental in nature at the
time of the proceedings.184
It is important to note that in states that recognize multi-parentage,
including California, each person seeking recognition as the child’s legal
parent must have a recognized basis for establishing parentage.185 While
California recognizes most of the grounds for establishing parentage described in Part II,186 it is not one of the states through which legal parentage can be established pursuant to an equitable parenthood doctrine.
California’s de facto parenthood doctrine provides limited rights relating
to standing, custody, and visitation, but not legal parentage.187 As a result, an individual cannot become the child’s third (or subsequent) parent
through the de facto parentage doctrine—they would need to satisfy one
of the other bases described in Part II for establishing legal parentage.188
Finally, California’s law governing custody disputes specifies that in cases
involving children who have more than two legal parents, courts do not
have to award shared legal or physical custody among all of the parents if
182. Compare In re Donovan L., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (refusing to recognize biological father with a claim for parentage pursuant to the holding out
presumption as the child’s third legal parent because he lacked an existing parental relationship with the child and thus was “not [the] child’s parent in every way.”), and In re
L.L., 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 915–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (same), with C.A. v. C.P., 240 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 38, 40, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (recognizing the biological father, who had satisfied
the requirements of the holding out provision, as the third parent of a child born to a
different-sex married couple where “the [lower] court found plaintiff has ‘an existing and
significant bond’ with the child”).
183. See supra note 182.
184. See supra note 182.
185. In re M.Z., 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“Thus, the language of
the statute, the legislative history, and the foregoing authorities lead us to the conclusion a
court considering a request for status as a third parent . . . should initially determine
whether or not a person seeking status as a third parent can establish a claim to parentage
under the Uniform Parentage Act.”).
186. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2021).
187. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 113.
188. See discussion supra Part II.
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doing so would be contrary to the child’s best interests.189
d. Maine
Maine’s statute recognizing multi-parentage provides less guidance to
courts regarding multi-parentage determinations. Enacted in 2015,
Maine’s statute states that, “Consistent with the establishment of parentage under this chapter, a court may determine that a child has more than
[two] parents.”190 Unlike California, the Maine statute does not explicitly
require the court to find that failing to recognize more than two parents
would be detrimental to the child in order for multi-parentage to be established.191 Maine recognizes, in some form, each of the bases for establishing parentage described in Part II.192 This includes the establishment
of parentage through satisfaction of the state’s equitable parenthood
doctrine.193
e. Vermont
In 2018, Vermont enacted a law providing that “a court may determine
that a child has more than two parents if the court finds that it is in the
best interests of the child to do so.”194 While Vermont, unlike Maine,
explicitly requires that the court determine multi-parentage is in the
child’s best interest, it does not go as far as California in requiring that
multi-parentage only be recognized where failing to do so would be detrimental to the child.195 Like Maine, Vermont recognizes, in some form,
each of the bases for establishing parentage described in Part II, including
the establishment of parentage through the state’s equitable parenthood
doctrine.196
f. Washington and Connecticut
In 2018 and 2021, respectively, Washington197 and Connecticut198 enacted the most recent version of the Uniform Parentage Act,199 which
includes an optional provision providing for the recognition of multi-par189. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(d) (West 2021).
190. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853(2) (2021).
191. See id.
192. See tit. 19-A, § 1851; discussion supra Sections II.A–H.
193. See tit. 19-A, § 1891(3); supra text accompanying note 112.
194. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 206(b) (West 2021).
195. Compare id., with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853(2) (2021) (“[A] court
may determine that a child has more than 2 parents.”), and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c)
(West 2021) (“[A] court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage . . . are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.”).
196. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 201 (West 2021); discussion supra Sections II.A–H.
197. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A (West 2021).
198. H.B. 6321, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021).
199. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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entage.200 The Washington and Connecticut legislatures opted to include
the language of that optional provision.201 Like California’s approach,
this approach specifies that the court can recognize more than two legal
parents only if failing to do so would be detrimental to the child.202 It also
provides similar guidance to courts for determining detriment to the
child, instructing the court to consider “all relevant factors, including the
harm if the child is removed from a stable placement with [a person] who
has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and psychological needs for care
and affection and has assumed the role for a substantial period.”203 Washington and Connecticut recognize, in some form, each of the bases for
establishing parentage described in Part II,204 including through the satisfaction of the state’s equitable parenthood doctrine.205
g. Nevada
In 2021, Nevada enacted a law providing that courts can recognize
multi-parentage through adoption proceedings.206 The law makes clear
that the written consent of all of the existing legal parents is required in
order for the adoption to occur.207
2. Judicial Recognition
Tracking judicial recognition of multi-parentage is a difficult task because many opinions in this context are unpublished.208 There have been,
however, a number of instances in which courts in jurisdictions that do
not statutorily recognize multi-parentage nonetheless determined that a
child has more than two legal parents. It is important, however, to distinguish true multi-parentage decisions from decisions in which the court
distributes custody or visitation between multiple parties in jurisdictions
that provide rights relating to custody or visitation to equitable parents or
other third parties, but do not recognize such parties as legal parents.209
200. Id. § 613(c) Alternative B (“The court may adjudicate a child to have more than
two parents under this [act] if the court finds that failure to recognize more than two parents would be detrimental to the child.”).
201. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.460(3) (West 2021); H.B. 6321 § 23(c), 2021
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021).
202. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.460(3) (West 2021); H.B. 6321 § 23(c), 2021
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2021).
203. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.460(3) (West 2021).
204. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.100, 26.26A.440(1)–(2) (West 2021); H.B. 6321
§ 23(c), 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); see discussion supra Sections II.A–H.
205. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440(1)–(2) (West 2021); H.B. 6321 § 38, 2021
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021).
206. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.030(7) (West 2021).
207. Id. § 124.040(1)(a).
208. See Quinn, supra note 15, at 187 (“Tracking the case law is difficult because evidently numerous unpublished cases exist.”).
209. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 477, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (distributing custody and visitation between three parties, but noting that “standing established by virtue of in loco parentis status does not elevate a third party to parity with a
natural parent in determining the merits of custody dispute”); LaChapelle v. Mitten (In re
Custody of L.M.K.O.), 607 N.W.2d 151, 159, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (distributing cus-
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While these cases are often referred to as multi-parentage cases, they are
not cases in which more than two people are recognized as full legal parents;210 as a result, those cases are not included in the discussion below.
Also not included are multi-parentage decisions rendered in a jurisdiction
that subsequently enacted a statute providing that multi-parentage can
occur through the mechanism recognized in the case (i.e., an equitable
parenthood doctrine, adoption, etc.).
a. Assisted Reproduction
In an unpublished decision, a lower court in Florida held, at the request
of the parties, that the sperm provider and a female same-sex couple to
whom the sperm was provided could all be listed as parents on the child’s
birth certificate.211 Pursuant to the agreement that was reached by the
parties and approved by the court, the same-sex couple was granted sole
parental responsibility (Florida’s term for legal custody),212 and the
sperm provider was granted visitation rights.213
b. Adoption
In a 1985 case that is often referred to as one of the first second-parent
adoption cases, but is actually a third-parent adoption case, a superior
court in Alaska allowed the same-sex partner of a child’s mother to adopt
the child without terminating the parentage of either of the child’s existing legal parents.214 The petitioner had been involved in caring for the
child since birth, and both of the existing legal parents consented to the
adoption.215 Attorneys report that there have been subsequent decisions
in Alaska granting third-parent adoptions, including one instance in
which a terminally ill mother sought to establish a male same-sex couple
as her child’s legal parents while also maintaining her own legal
parentage.216
In Oregon, a court granted a third-parent adoption to the stepfather of
children who already had two existing legal parents: their mother (who
tody and visitation rights between mother, her former partner, and the biological father,
but referring to the mother’s former partner as a non-parent).
210. See Quinn, supra note 15, at 179–80.
211. Id. at 198.
212. STEVEN SCOTT STEPHENS, 23 FLA. PRAC., Florida Family Law § 9.20, Westlaw
(database updated June 2021).
213. Kelly Kennedy & Associated Press, Gay Sperm Donor, Lesbian Couple Reach
Agreement, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:04 PM), https://www.courant.com/sdutgay-sperm-donor-lesbian-couple-reach-agreement-2013feb08-story.html [https://perma.cc/
8KBK-9C3H].
214. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
201, 243 (2009).
215. Debra E. Guston & William S. Singer, The State of Gay and Lesbian Adoption in
New Jersey, 239-APR N.J. L. 35, 38 (2006) (citing In re Adoption of A.O.L., No. IJU-8525-P/A (Alaska Super. Ct. 1985)).
216. Jennifer Peltz, Courts and ‘Tri-Parenting’: A State-by-State Look, BOSTON.COM
(June 18, 2017), https://www.boston.com/news/national-news/2017/06/18/courts-and-triparenting-a-state-by-state-look [https://perma.cc/A88U-ZRYK].
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was married to the stepfather) and their biological father (who had maintained a close relationship with the children).217 The adoption was seemingly granted at the request of all of the parties.218 Oregon attorneys have
reported other instances of courts allowing third-parent adoptions, including one case in which three adults in an intimate relationship undertook having a child together219 and another case in which a child’s
biological parents consented to an adoption by the biological mother’s
former partner, who had helped raised the children.220 Attorneys also
have reported third-parent adoptions occurring in other jurisdictions that
do not have statutes explicitly recognizing multi-parentage via adoption,
such as Massachusetts221 and Washington, D.C.222
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF MULTI-PARENTAGE
A. THE CONSENT

OF THE

EXISTING LEGAL PARENTS

1. The Question
In the context of two-party parentage, a number of the mechanisms
through which an individual can establish themselves as the child’s second legal parent require the consent of the existing legal parent.223 This
includes, for example, parentage establishment through consent to assisted reproduction,224 VAPs, step- and second-parent adoption, equitable parenthood doctrines, and (arguably) holding out provisions.225 An
important and unsettled question relates to whether the consent of just
one, or instead all, of the existing legal parents will be required if states
recognize a mechanism in this category as one through which multi-parentage can be established. If the consent of all of the existing legal parents is required, an additional question arises regarding whether the
definition of consent will encompass both express and implied consent.
Thus far, few legislatures or courts have addressed the consent issue directly. When courts or legislatures have addressed the issue, it has oc217. Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to Three Parents, or Four, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/us/a-california-bill-would-legalize-third-andfourth-parent-adoptions.html [https://perma.cc/A5QT-JFNP].
218. Id. (stating that one of the children described the result as one that was happy for
everyone involved).
219. Jodi A. Argentino, Families By Design, THE LGBTQ+ BAR (2015), https://
lgbtbar.org/annual/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/05/Families-by-DesignLAVLAW.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KVS-78Y3] (citing In re Adoption of A.L. and E.L., Case No. 920765717 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1992)).
220. Peltz, supra note 216.
221. Guston & Singer, supra note 215, at 38.
222. Quinn, supra note 15, at 199–200 n.84.
223. See supra Part II.
224. While the language of some jurisdictions’ consent to ART statutes only explicitly
requires the consent of the person seeking to establish parentage over the child conceived
by their spouse or partner, it is generally understood that the consent of the other party—
the party undertaking ART to conceive—is also required. See JOSLIN, MINTER &
SAKIMURA supra note 49, § 3:4.
225. See supra Part II. See also infra note 372 (discussing whether consent of the existing legal parent is required for parentage establishment through holding out provisions).
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curred primarily in the contexts of the recognition of multi-parentage
through adoption and the recognition of multi-parentage or multi-party
parental rights through equitable parenthood doctrines.
In the context of multi-parentage establishment through adoption, so
far the statutory and judicial developments (albeit limited) seem to point
in the direction of requiring the express consent of all existing legal parents. For example, the language of Nevada’s statute is clear in requiring
the written consent of all existing legal parents to establish multi-parentage through adoption.226 California’s multi-parentage adoption provision
specifies that the existing legal parent or parents can maintain their legal
parentage after the adoption only “if both the existing parent or parents
and the prospective adoptive parent or parents sign a waiver at any time
prior to the finalization of the adoption.”227 This language seems to indicate that creating a multi-parent family through adoption would require
the express consent of all existing legal parents and all prospective adoptive parents, and this is how commentators have interpreted the provision.228 In addition, the cases discussed above granting third-parent
adoptions in jurisdictions that lack explicit statutory recognition of multiparentage generally appear to involve situations in which all of the existing legal parents expressly consented to the adoption.229
The question of whether all existing legal parents’ consent is required
for an additional party to establish parental rights or full legal parentage
has received greater scrutiny in the context of equitable parenthood doctrines. As discussed above, a common element of equitable parenthood
doctrines is that the child’s existing legal parent consented to, supported,
or fostered the formation of the petitioner’s relationship with the child.230
It is generally understood that a primary purpose of including this element in equitable parenthood doctrines is to recognize a fit legal parent’s
fundamental constitutional right to make decisions regarding the care,
custody, and control of their child and to head off arguments that equitable parenthood doctrines violate this fundamental right.231 Specifically, if
a legal parent has chosen to exercise their fundamental parental rights by
consenting to, supporting, or fostering the formation of a parental relationship between another party and the child, the legal parent cannot
subsequently argue that providing that individual with parental rights violates their constitutional rights.232 However, in the vast majority of states
226. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
227. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617(b) (Deering 2021).
228. See JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 5:12 (“California now explicitly
permits third parent adoptions where all parties agree, the adoption is in the best interests
of the child, and all other requirements of adoption are met.”).
229. See supra Section III.B.2.
230. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 447 (Md. 2016); In re Parentage of
L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005); In re H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 436 (Wis. 1995);
ABRAMS, CAHN, ROSS & MCCLAIN, supra note 139, at 935; Feinberg, supra note 106, at 70;
Marvel, supra note 8, at 2061–62.
232. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000).
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with equitable parenthood doctrines, the language of the consent element
leaves open the questions of whose consent is required in situations
where a child has more than one existing legal parent and what form any
required consent must take.
In each of the five states where multi-parentage can be established
through an equitable parenthood doctrine, the language of the consent
element does not expressly address whose consent would be required in
situations where there are already two or more existing legal parents.
However, on its face, the language of the de facto parentage statutes in
four of these states—Maine, Vermont, Washington, and Connecticut—
seems to point in the direction of requiring the consent of only one of the
existing legal parents.233 Specifically, the language of the consent element
of these states’ de facto parentage doctrines requires only that the relationship between the petitioner and the child was fostered or supported
by “another parent” of the child.234 Moreover, in these jurisdictions, the
statutory de facto parentage provisions and the statutory provisions providing that a child may have more than two legal parents were adopted at
the same time, through the same bill.235 This means that the legislatures
in these jurisdictions were contemplating the possibility of multi-parentage when they adopted the language of the de facto parentage statute
requiring the consent of “another parent.”236 The language of Delaware’s
de facto parentage standard is more ambiguous, requiring “the support
and consent of the child’s parent or parents,” and, unlike the other states
in this category, when Delaware adopted its de facto parentage standard,
it did not also adopt a separate statutory provision explicitly providing
that a child can have more than two legal parents.237
233. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891(3)(C) (2016) (requiring that “the relationship was fostered or supported by another parent of the child and the person and the other
parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as though the person
is a parent of the child”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1)(F) (West 2018) (requiring
that “the person and another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and
dependent relationship”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440(4)(f) (West 2019) (requiring that “[a]nother parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship”); H.B. 6321 § 38(6), 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021)
(effective January 1, 2022) (same); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d) (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2017) (same).
234. See supra note 233. A Washington appellate court has interpreted the “another
parent” language of the consent element of the state’s de facto parentage statute as requiring the consent of only one of the existing legal parents. In re Parentage of L.J.M., 476 P.3d
636, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, The Constitutional Limits on
Custodial and Support Parentage by Consent, 56 IDAHO L. REV. 421, 442–43 (2020) (interpreting the “another parent” language from the UPA’s de facto parentage standard to
mean that the consent of all existing legal parents is not required). The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court, however, reached a different conclusion. Martin v. MacMahan, 264 A.3d
1224, 1234 (Me. 2021) (interpreting the phrase “another parent” within the consent element of the state’s de facto parentage doctrine to require the consent of any “legal parent
who appears and objects to the de facto parentage petition”).
235. S.B. 6037, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) H.B. 562, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess
(Vt. 2018); An Act to Update Maine’s Family Law, ch. 296, § 1, 2015 Me. Laws 706; see
also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
236. See infra note 306.
237. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2021).
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Most jurisdictions with equitable parenthood doctrines that provide
only limited rights relating to custody and visitation, as opposed to full
legal parentage, also do not have clear language in the standard specifying whose consent would be required in situations where there are already two or more existing legal parents. Generally, the language of the
consent element in these jurisdictions refers simply to the consent or support of “the legal parent” and does not explicitly address whether the
consent of all existing legal parents is required.238 One potential explanation for this is that the legislatures or courts in these jurisdictions were
not contemplating application of the doctrine in situations where a child
already had two fit legal parents.239 Washington, D.C. represents an exception to the general lack of clarity regarding the consent element, specifically requiring as an element of its de facto parentage standard “the
agreement of the child’s parent or, if there are [two] parents, both
parents.”240
A handful of state appellate courts have directly addressed questions
relating to whether the state’s equitable parenthood doctrine should be
interpreted to require that all of the existing legal parents consented to
the formation of the relationship between the petitioner and child and, if
so, what form the consent must take. It is important to note, however,
that several of these decisions occurred in states where the laws in existence at the time (some of which are still in existence) neither recognized
equitable parents as full legal parents nor provided that a child could
have more than two legal parents. For example, in K.A.F. v. D.L.M., a
2014 New Jersey appellate court decision, the former partner of one of
the child’s legal parents, who claimed that she had served in a parental
role to the child for over six years, sought to establish herself as a psychological parent.241 Individuals who qualify as psychological parents under
New Jersey law are entitled to standing to seek custody of the child, and
the requirements for establishing psychological parentage include that
“the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the
third party and the child.”242 Both legal parents opposed the petition,
arguing that the petitioner could not establish herself as a psychological
parent since only one of the legal parents had consented to the formation
of the parent–child relationship.243 The lower court granted summary
judgment, holding that because there was no genuine issue of material
fact regarding the contention that one of the legal parents had not consented to the relationship, the petitioner’s claim failed as a matter of
238. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Section II.H (describing the history of equitable parenthood doctrines).
240. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1)(A)(iii) (2021); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM.
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2021) (setting
forth as an element of parentage by estoppel that there was “a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent [or, if there are two legal parents, both parents]”).
241. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 977 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
242. Id. at 980–81.
243. See id. at 978–79.
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law.244 The appellate court overturned the lower court’s decision and
held that only one legal parent’s consent was necessary.245
While the court acknowledged the fundamental constitutional right of
fit parents to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their
children, it explained that the right was not absolute and could be overcome by “‘exceptional circumstances’ affecting the welfare of the
child.”246 The court further explained that psychological parenthood
cases fell within the broader category of exceptional circumstances cases,
stating that “the transcendent importance of preventing harm to a child
weighs more heavily in the balance [than] the fundamental custody rights
of a non-forsaking parent.”247 Regarding the policy implications involved,
the court reasoned that to deny recognition of an individual as a child’s
psychological parent on the sole basis that one of the legal parents had
not consented to the relationship would “ignore the ‘psychological harm’
a child might suffer because he is deprived of the care of a psychological
parent.”248 The court also stated that a consent requirement that rendered the court “powerless to avert harm to a child through the severance
of the child’s parental bond with a third party” would be contrary to the
court’s well-established policies of protecting children from harm.249 The
court did specify, however, that it was not wholly discounting the importance of one legal parent’s lack of consent.250 It explained that courts
could still consider it as a factor in determining whether the other elements of the psychological parenthood doctrine were satisfied or whether
awarding custody or visitation to the petitioner would further the child’s
best interests.251 But notably, the longer the third party had served in a
parental role, the less lack of consent from one of the legal parents would
factor into the analysis.252
In another 2014 decision, the Court of Appeals of Washington (Division 3) reached a different conclusion regarding the interpretation of the
consent element of the equitable parenthood doctrine in place at the
time.253 In In re Parentage of J.B.R., the mother’s former partner, who
the eleven-year-old child viewed as her father and had been raised to
know as her father since the age of two, sought to establish de facto parentage.254 Although the case was decided before Washington statutorily
recognized de facto parentage or identified it as a mechanism for establishing full legal parentage, under the state’s common law approach a de
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See id. at 977–78.
See id. at 983.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 980, 982.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 982.
See id. at 983.
See id.
See id.
In re Parentage of J.B.R., 336 P.3d 648, 649–50 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
See id. at 649.
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facto parent stood “in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent.”255 The
first element of the doctrine required that “the natural or legal parent
consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship.”256 In denying the
mother’s argument that a third party could not become the de facto parent of a child who already had two fit legal parents, the court held that de
facto parentage could be established “if the . . . petitioner establishes the
relevant four factors, which include establishing that both legal parents
consented to the [petitioner] being a parent to the child.”257 The court
explained that a standard that allows an individual who “undertook an
unequivocal and permanent parental role with the consent of all existing
parents” to establish de facto parentage strikes the correct balance with
regard to the rights of the existing legal parents, the child, and other
parties.258
In applying the element requiring both existing legal parents’ consent,
however, the court made clear that the consent to the formation of the
petitioner’s relationship with the child does not have to be express.259
While the mother’s consent was clear and uncontested, the court also
held that the biological father had impliedly consented to and fostered
the relationship between the petitioner and the child by choosing to “voluntarily absent[ ] himself” from his child’s life for over a decade, during
which time he neither saw nor supported the child.260 The biological father’s decision to neither support nor seek a relationship with his daughter over the years evidenced his consent to the petitioner filling the
parental role left vacant and fostered the formation of the relationship
between the petitioner and child.261
Following In re Parentage of J.B.R., however, Washington enacted a
statute that recognized multi-parentage, established de facto parentage as
a mechanism through which full legal parentage could be obtained, and
identified the elements of de facto parentage.262 The elements set forth
by the statute include that “[a]nother parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship” between the child and
the petitioner.263 In 2020, the Washington Court of Appeals (Division 2)
reversed and remanded a lower court decision dismissing a stepfather’s
petition to establish de facto parentage.264 One of the issues on appeal
was the proper interpretation of the consent element of the state’s de
facto parentage doctrine.265 The court held that only one parent’s consent
was necessary to satisfy this element, explaining that under the express
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 649–50. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 653.
See id.
Id. at 654.
See id. at 653–54.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440 (West 2019).
Id. § 26.26A.440(4) (emphasis added).
In re Parentage of L.J.M., 476 P.3d 636, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
See id. at 644–55.
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language of the statute, “[t]he only requirement is that one parent—
‘[a]nother parent’—support the petitioner’s relationship with the
child.”266 The court, however, did not engage in a constitutional or policybased analysis of the issue, relying solely on the statutory language in
reaching its conclusion.267 In a footnote, the court addressed the earlier
decision in In re Parentage of J.B.R., explaining that the court in that case
was applying the prior common law standard governing de facto parentage, which required the consent of all existing legal parents.268 The court
went on to explain that the current statute governing de facto parentage,
which superseded J.B.R., departs from the prior common law approach as
it “clearly refers to [the consent of] ‘[a]nother parent,’ not both
parents.”269
In 2021, Maryland’s highest court addressed the consent question in a
lengthy opinion that included a strongly worded dissent.270 In E.N. v.
T.R., the father’s girlfriend, with whom the father’s two children had lived
for three years, sought to establish de facto parentage.271 Under Maryland’s de facto parentage doctrine, qualifying individuals are not full legal
parents, but they do have “standing to contest custody or visitation and
[unlike other third parties] need not show parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a trial court can apply a best interests of the
child analysis.”272 The first element of the de facto parentage doctrine is
“that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child.”273 The children’s biological mother argued that due to the
constitutional protections afforded to legal parents, a third party could
not become the child’s de facto parent without the consent of both of the
existing legal parents.274 Overturning the decision of the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a party seeking
to establish de facto parentage must prove that both existing legal parents
consented to the formation of their relationship with the child.275 If both
parents did not consent, the petitioner is left to seek custody or visitation
under the standards governing third-party claims.276
The court justified its decision on both constitutional and policy-based
grounds. In terms of the constitutional justifications, the court explained
266. Id. at 644.
267. See id.
268. See id. at n.4.
269. Id.
270. See E.N. v. T.R., 255 A.3d 1 (Md. 2021).
271. See id. at 3–4.
272. Id. at 15.
273. Id. at 1.
274. See id. at 9.
275. See id. at 3.
276. See id. at 22 (“In cases not involving de facto parents, i.e., cases involving third
parties seeking custody or visitation, this Court has repeatedly concluded that to award
custody or visitation to the third party, the third party must show that the parents are unfit
or that exceptional circumstances exist, before a trial court can apply the best interests of
the child standard.”).
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that parents have a fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and
control of their children, and that there is a well-established presumption
that parents act in a way that promotes the best interests of their children.277 In the court’s view, a rule that does not require the consent of
both of the existing legal parents “undermines and, essentially, negates”
the non-consenting parent’s fundamental rights.278 In terms of policy-related considerations, the court stated that a rule requiring only one
party’s consent could result in situations that were unworkable for everyone involved.279 Specifically, it could lead to the non-consenting parent
having to co-parent with someone whom they did not realize was forming
a parental relationship with their child or even possibly someone whom
they had never met, resulting in “further conflict foreordained” for everyone involved.280 The court further explained that it would rarely be in
children’s best interests to subject them to custody and visitation orders
among three or more parents who have demonstrated little or no ability
to co-parent together.281
After determining that the consent of all existing legal parents was necessary to satisfy the de facto parentage doctrine, the court turned to the
question of the type of consent required.282 The court held that the consent could be express or implied and could occur through either action or
inaction, as long as the consent “is knowing and voluntary and would be
understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent to the formation
of a parent-like relationship between a third party and a child.”283 With
regard to proving that a legal parent had consented through their inaction, the court explained that “implied consent by inaction would consist
of the legal parent having sufficient information concerning the fostering
of a parent-like relationship between a third party and the parent’s child
and the parent knowingly and voluntarily not objecting.”284
In applying the standard to the facts of the case, the court determined
that the biological mother had neither expressly nor impliedly consented
to the formation of the parental relationship between the children and
the father’s girlfriend.285 At the time of the trial, the children had lived in
a household with the girlfriend for three years.286 During the first two
years, the children’s father also lived in the household, but after he went
to prison the children continued to live with the girlfriend for another
year before she sought to establish de facto parentage.287 Although there
was only one documented occasion on which the mother had seen the
277.
278.
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280.
281.
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children during this three-year period, the court determined that the implied consent standard was not satisfied because the mother’s lack of objection to the formation of the relationship between the children and
girlfriend (i.e., her inaction) was not “knowing and voluntary.”288 The
court reasoned that while the mother knew the father had a girlfriend, for
most of the period in which the children resided with the girlfriend the
mother did not know who the girlfriend was or where she resided.289 The
mother had not met the girlfriend until two years after the children began
living with her and did not know the importance of the girlfriend in the
children’s lives.290 The court also noted that the mother had not abandoned her children by leaving them in the care of a third party for a
substantial period, but rather had simply given permission for the children to live with their other legal parent—a common occurrence between
legal parents who do not reside together.291 According to the court, taken
together with the fact that the mother had attempted to locate the children and have them returned to her on a few occasions, the evidence
supported the conclusion that the mother had neither knowingly consented to the formation of the relationship between the girlfriend and the
children nor abandoned her children.292
The dissenting opinion expressed strong disagreement with both the
constitutional and policy-based justifications set forth in the majority
opinion. In terms of the constitutional justifications, the dissent acknowledged the fundamental right of fit parents to direct the care, custody, and
control of their children, but pointed out that that this right is not absolute.293 The dissent argued that the paramount concern in all custody
cases is the well-being and interests of the child, and that it is well established that a child’s interests may outweigh the rights of a parent.294 According to the dissent, a standard that allows for the severance of the
relationship between the child and someone whom they view as a parent
simply because one of the legal parents did not consent to the relationship’s formation fails to sufficiently provide for children’s interests and
“inevitably will result in judicial determinations that harm children.”295
The dissent further noted that the harm to children resulting from such a
rule was clearly demonstrated in this case—although the girlfriend had
satisfied all of the other elements of the de facto parentage standard and
the children viewed her as their mother and desired to live with her, the
non-consenting parent was able to unilaterally sever the relationship.296
The dissent also disagreed with the idea that requiring only one parent’s consent to the formation of the de facto parent relationship “ne288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 26–27.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 27.
See id.
See id. at 31.
See id.
Id. at 40.
See id. at 40–42.
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gates” the non-consenting parent’s fundamental rights.297 The court
pointed out that identifying an individual as a child’s de facto parent does
not somehow make the non-consenting parent “less of a parent.”298 It
also does not necessarily mean that the non-consenting parent will have
to share custody with the de facto parent—the court will not issue a joint
custody order, even among legal parents, if such an arrangement would
be contrary to the best interests of the child.299 Moreover, even if the
non-consenting party must share custody or visitation with the de facto
parent, the non-consenting parent nonetheless maintains their legal parentage and all of the rights and obligations flowing therefrom.300
In terms of the policy-related justifications set forth by the majority,
the dissent expressed disagreement with the view that a rule requiring
only one party’s consent would necessarily result in unworkable, conflictridden parenting arrangements that harm children.301 The dissent explained that in all custody disputes the court is tasked with creating an
order that promotes the best interests of the child, and family courts are
well-versed in creating custody arrangements that account for potential
conflicts between the parents.302 Regardless of how many parties are involved, a court that is concerned with potential conflict can tailor its order accordingly.303 Moreover, the dissent noted that while some
situations involving de facto parents may require orders that grant sole
physical or legal custody to one of the parties due to the inability of the
parties to co-parent, that will not always be the case—“adults who did not
previously know each other well (or even at all), but who both have the
best interests of a child at heart, may well find a way to co-parent effectively.”304 In fact, individuals who do not carry the baggage of a failed
romantic relationship may, in some instances, actually be better able to
co-parent without conflict.305
The dissent also addressed the majority’s concerns regarding fairness to
the non-consenting parent, acknowledging the pain and frustration a parent may feel if parental rights are given to a third party who formed a
relationship with the child without that parent’s consent.306 However, in
the dissent’s view, “the nonconsenting parent’s understandable anguish is
not a sufficient reason to empower that parent unilaterally to sever the
parental-type psychological bond that the would-be de facto parent has
formed with the child through no fault of the adult or child.”307 The dissent further noted that parents understand that their relationship with the
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 32.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 33–34.
See id. at 34.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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other parent may end and that the other parent may subsequently enter
into a relationship with someone else who comes to play a parental role
in the child’s life—it is an inherent risk that a person assumes in becoming “one-half of a union that produces a child.”308 Overall, in the dissent’s
view, none of the policy-related reasons for requiring both parents’ consent were strong enough to outweigh the policy interests in granting
courts the ability to protect children from the psychological harm that
they would suffer from the loss of a relationship with someone they view
as a parent.309
Most recently, and just a few months after the Maryland decision,
Maine’s highest court directly addressed the issue.310 Maine is a state that
recognizes multi-parentage and provides full legal parentage to individuals who satisfy the state’s de facto parentage doctrine.311 In Martin v.
MacMahan, a couple (the biological mother’s lifelong friend and the
friend’s husband) sought to establish de facto parentage of two children.312 The couple had supported the mother throughout her pregnancy
and provided care and necessities for the children from the time of their
birth.313 The children’s biological father had moved to Kansas when the
children were four months old and did not provide any support or care
for the children, despite the mother’s continued requests.314 When the
children were two years old, they began to live primarily with the couple,
who provided for all aspects of their care.315
Over a year after the couple had begun providing full-time care for the
children, the father returned to Maine.316 After the mother refused to
allow him to see the children, he initiated a divorce action and returned
to Kansas.317 When he returned to Maine a few months later to visit the
children, it was the first time he had seen them in three years.318 The
court approved a custody agreement between the mother and father providing that they would share parental rights and the mother would have
primary physical custody.319 The children continued to reside primarily
with the couple.320 After the couple sought a protective order against the
mother on behalf of the children, the father granted the couple temporary legal authority over the children and subsequently moved for a modification of the custody order seeking primary physical custody and sole
legal custody.321 The judge declined to modify the order beyond provid308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
See id. at 33–34.
Martin v. MacMahan, 264 A.3d 1224 (Me. 2021).
See ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, §§ 1853, 1891 (2021).
See Martin, 264 A.3d at 1226–27.
See id. at 1227.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1228.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ing that the children could visit the father in Kansas.322 The father failed
to return the children to Maine in compliance with the court’s visitation
order, which resulted in the couple traveling to Kansas to retrieve the
children.323 Upon returning to Maine, the couple filed a petition seeking
de facto parentage, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support.324 Throughout the years that the couple had been the children’s primary caretakers, they had received a total of $100 from the father and $75
from the mother.325
The lower court determined that the couple had satisfied the de facto
parentage doctrine.326 On appeal, the father argued, inter alia, that the
lower court’s decision infringed on his fundamental constitutional rights
as a parent because it granted the couple de facto parentage without finding that he had fostered and supported the relationship between the
couple and the children.327 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine set out
to determine whether, in order for the state’s de facto parentage statute
to pass constitutional scrutiny, the court must interpret the requirement
that “another parent” fostered or supported the petitioner’s relationship
with the child to require that each legal parent fostered or supported the
relationship.328 The court answered in the affirmative, holding that to establish de facto parentage the petitioner must prove each element of the
standard as to any existing parent who appears and objects to the petition.329 The court stated that because establishing someone as a child’s de
facto parent is an intrusion into the rights of the existing legal parents
that is “no less permanent than the termination of parental rights,” the
statute must undergo a strict scrutiny analysis.330 The court then concluded that to allow for the establishment of de facto parentage without
proof that each existing parent fostered or supported the relationship
“would potentially allow the unilateral actions of one legal parent to
cause an unconstitutional dilution of another legal parent’s rights.”331
Importantly, however, the court went on to state that under its interpretation of the consent element, the petitioner did not have to prove
that each existing parent had expressly consented to the relationship.332
The court explained that “[i]f such consent were required, there could be
no litigation of any de facto parentage claim because a legal parent’s objection would necessarily defeat the claim.”333 Instead, a petitioner can
meet the consent element by “demonstrating that the child’s legal parent
322.
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or parents have implicitly, through acts or omissions if not through words,
fostered, supported, and accepted the person’s parental role.”334 Applying the standard to the facts of the case, the court determined that the
petitioners had satisfied the consent element.335 In support of its determination, the court noted the lower court’s findings that the father either
knew or should have known from early on that the children were living
with the couple.336 The father understood and accepted, “at least implicitly[,]” that the couple was serving a parental role in the lives of the children.337 The court further explained that the father had abdicated his
responsibilities for the children, and that this created a gap in the children’s lives with regard to care and nurture that the couple filled.338 Concluding that the petitioners had satisfied each element of the standard,
the court upheld the lower court’s determination that the couple had established de facto parentage.339
2. Thoughts on Resolving the Question
The analysis of whether the consent of all existing legal parents should
be required for multi-parentage establishment through mechanisms that
in the two-party parentage context require the existing legal parent’s consent, as well as the form of any required consent, differs significantly depending on the mechanism through which multi-parentage is sought. The
result is that there is a relatively strong argument that a standard that
does not require the express consent of all existing legal parents for
multi-parentage establishment through equitable parenthood doctrines
and similar mechanisms that require an established parent–child relationship is sound, both constitutionally and as a matter of policy. For the
other parentage establishment mechanisms that require the consent of a
legal parent, however, it is much clearer that constitutional considerations
mandate, and policy-based considerations support, requiring the express
consent of all existing legal parents. These parentage establishment mechanisms include adoption and, if states allow for the recognition of multiparentage through such mechanisms, VAPs340 and consent to ART
334. Id. at 1236 (emphasis added).
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See id. The court also noted that the father had taken certain actions to foster the
relationship between the couple and the children that went beyond omissions, such as
granting the couple temporary legal authority and thanking them for raising the children.
Id.
339. See id. at 1237.
340. It is unclear whether U.S. jurisdictions will recognize VAPs as a method through
which multi-parentage can occur. The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, for example, states
that a VAP is void if the child already has a presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated parent (besides the individual who gave birth), which seems to remove the possibility of establishing an individual as a child’s third parent through a VAP. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The requirement in many states’ VAP forms that the parties
attest that the individual seeking to establish parentage is the child’s biological father and
the inability of married individuals to utilize a VAP to establish the parentage of someone
other than their spouse (either at all or unless the spouse is willing to give up their parental
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provisions.341
a. Equitable Parenthood and Similar Doctrines that Require an
Established Parent–Child Relationship
The issue of whether the express consent of all existing legal parents
should be required for multi-parentage establishment through equitable
parenthood doctrines presents an extremely difficult question with strong
arguments on each side. However, due to the paramount importance of
children’s best interests, it is neither necessary nor desirable for parentage establishment through equitable parenthood doctrines to require the
express consent of each of the existing legal parents. A better approach is
to either (1) require the consent of only one of the existing legal parents,
or (2) require the consent of each existing legal parent, but adopt a broad
definition of consent that includes implied consent. It is likely that more
courts and state legislatures will adopt the latter approach, which raises
fewer constitutional issues and represents a compromise between requiring the consent of only one of the existing parents and requiring the express consent of each existing parent. However, both options arguably
are permissible, both constitutionally and as a matter of policy.
While legal parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children, it is well-established
that this right is not absolute and must be weighed against competing
state interests.342 For example, in most states, certain categories of third
parties can be granted custody of a child over the wishes of a child’s legal
parent if extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist such that denying the third party custody would harm the child.343 In determining harm
to the child, the type of bond and relationship formed between the child
and the third party is usually a primary consideration.344
Similarly, while the Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville struck down
as unconstitutional as applied a visitation statute that allowed the court to
grant any party visitation rights at any time if it determined doing so was
in the child’s best interests, the Court stated only that the wishes of the
legal parent must be given “special weight” in visitation determinarights) also seem to weigh against the likelihood of recognition of multi-parentage through
VAPs. See supra Section II.C.
341. It is unclear if in the unpublished Florida decision referenced above, in which a
court allowed a same-sex couple and the sperm provider to be listed on the birth certificate, the court relied on a consent to ART provision for establishing any of the parties’
parentage. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. It is possible that the birth mother
was recognized as a legal parent due to having given birth, her spouse based on the marital
presumption, and the provider based on genetic ties.
342. See E.N. v. T.R., 255 A.3d 1, 31 (Md. 2021); see also David D. Meyer, Partners,
Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 47, 64 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not
applied the usual strict scrutiny standard in the context of substantive due process protections of parents’ rights, instead applying “a more open-ended balancing of public and private interests”).
343. See ABRAMS, CAHN, ROSS & MCCLAIN, supra note 139, at 790–91.
344. See id.; see also Ross v. Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582, 593 (Md. 1977).
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tions.345 Today, every state has some form of a third-party visitation law
granting certain categories of third parties the right to seek visitation in
specified circumstances.346 Many of these laws allow courts to grant a
third party visitation if it would further the child’s best interests.347 Other
third-party visitation laws allow courts to grant visitation if denying the
visitation would be detrimental to the child.348 The type of relationship
the third party shares with the child is usually a key factor in determining
whether the relevant standard is satisfied.349 These non-parent custody
and visitation standards, implemented by states across the country,
demonstrate the understanding that the state’s interest in protecting children from the harm that will occur through disrupting their relationship
with important individuals in their lives can outweigh a parent’s fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of the child.350
Although establishing a party as an additional legal parent through an
equitable parenthood doctrine as opposed to providing the party with
rights relating only to custody or visitation is arguably a greater intrusion
on the rights of the existing legal parents, it is important to note that it
does not alter the existing parents’ legal status. Contrary to the assertion
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Martin v. MacMahan,351 establishing a third party as a legal parent through an equitable parenthood
doctrine is not akin to the termination of the parental rights of the existing parents.352 On the contrary, as the dissenting opinion in E.N. v.
T.R. noted, when multi-parentage is established through an equitable
parenthood doctrine, the existing parents remain legal parents with the
myriad essential rights and responsibilities that attach to that status.353
There is a strong argument that when an individual is able to meet all
of the elements necessary to satisfy an equitable parenthood doctrine, it
demonstrates exactly the type of circumstances that are extraordinary
enough to outweigh the legal parent’s fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their child.354 Satisfaction of an equitable parenthood doctrine generally requires showing not
only that the petitioner has, with a legal parent’s support, resided with the
child for a significant period and taken on the responsibilities of
parenthood, but also that the individual has formed a bonded, dependent
345. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69–72 (2000); see also Meyer, supra note 342, at
64–65.
346. ABRAMS, CAHN, ROSS & MCCLAIN, supra note 139, at 926.
347. 4 A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON, JULIE ANN GARBER, ROBERT A. MEAD & MOLLY M.
WOOD, ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT § 37:29 (2021); 69 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts
281, § 4 (2021).
348. DAYTON, GARBER, MEAD & WOOD, supra note 347, § 37:30; see 69 AM. JUR. 3D,
supra note 347, § 4.
349. 69 AM. JUR. 3D, supra note 347, § 9.5; 51 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 573, § 10 (2021).
350. Meyer, supra note 342, at 64–66.
351. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
352. See E.N. v. T.R., 255 A.3d 1, 45 (Md. 2021) (Biran, J., dissenting).
353. Id.
354. See id.
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relationship with the child that is parental in nature.355 A wide body of
social science research demonstrates that disrupting the relationship between a child and someone who they view as a parent can result in serious short- and long-term harm to the child.356 Even if an individual who
is not recognized as a legal parent is granted standing to seek custody or
visitation (as opposed to being treated as a legal stranger), they generally
will be at a significant disadvantage in seeking custody and visitation
rights.357 In addition, the failure to recognize an individual as the child’s
legal parent means the child will be deprived of important rights relating
to, inter alia, support, inheritance, healthcare, and social security.358 The
serious potential harm to the child resulting from denying legal recognition to an individual with whom they share a bonded, dependent relationship that is parental in nature elucidates the extraordinary nature of these
circumstances.
Importantly, there are steps that states concerned with protecting their
multi-parentage laws from constitutional challenges could take that involve a lesser risk of harm to the child’s well-being than requiring the
express consent of all legal parents for multi-parentage establishment
through equitable parenthood doctrines. States could, for example, adopt
the general approach to multi-parentage determinations taken by California, Washington, Connecticut, and the 2017 UPA. This approach requires
a showing of detriment to the child before courts will recognize more
than two individuals as a child’s legal parents (regardless of whether the
multi-parentage claim arises via an equitable parenthood doctrine or via
some other basis for establishing parentage).359 Alternatively, states that
adopt a best interests—as opposed to detriment—standard for multi-parentage claims could specify that the objection of an existing parent who
did not expressly consent to the formation of the relationship must be
given special weight in the best interests analysis.360
There are also persuasive policy considerations that support a standard
that does not require the express consent of each of the existing legal
parents in establishing multi-parentage through satisfaction of equitable
parenthood or similar doctrines. While, at least in the context of two fit
and involved legal parents, it may seem unjust to allow the spouse or
partner of one of the legal parents to establish parentage without the
other legal parent’s express consent, this concern must be weighed
against the potential harm to the child in failing to recognize the relation355. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
356. Feinberg, supra note 106, at 64–66.
357. See Feinberg, supra note 21, at 114. In most states, even individuals who qualify as
equitable parents face higher burdens in obtaining custody or visitation against a legal
parent’s wishes. Feinberg, supra note 106, at 68 n.80.
358. Feinberg, supra note 21, at 113.
359. See supra notes 178, 199, 202.
360. See K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 982–83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (holding that although both parents’ consent was not required for another party to become the
child’s de facto parent, the lack of consent of one of the parents could be considered by the
trial court in analyzing the best interests of the child).
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ship. At the end of the day, the fact that the child has formed a bonded,
dependent parental relationship with the individual in question remains
true regardless of whether just one, or both, of the existing legal parents
expressly consented to the relationship.361 Allowing the fact that one of
the parents did not expressly consent to, in effect, sever the relationship
between the child and a parental figure, even though all of the other elements required to establish equitable parenthood are satisfied, would result in the exact type of harm to the child that equitable parenthood
doctrines were created to avoid.362
Moreover, the potential for co-parenting conflicts between the nonconsenting parent and the petitioner does not justify requiring both legal
parents’ express consent to the formation of the relationship. As an initial
matter, in most states that have adopted multi-parentage laws, a court
cannot recognize more than two legal parents unless it determines either
that not recognizing the multi-parentage claim would be detrimental to
the child or that recognizing the multi-parentage claim would further the
child’s best interests.363 The result under either standard is that in situations where the court determines that recognizing multi-parentage would
not be beneficial to the child due to the level of conflict among the parties, the petitioner would not be recognized as the child’s legal parent
despite having satisfied the elements of the equitable parenthood
doctrine.
In addition, the potential for conflict between the parties if the petitioner is able to establish parentage pursuant to an equitable parenthood
doctrine is not unique to situations where one of the legal parents has not
expressly consented to the formation of the relationship between the petitioner and child. As countless custody cases involving former spouses or
partners demonstrate, conflict frequently arises between parents who, at
some prior point, expressly consented to and fostered each other’s relationship with the child. Furthermore, equitable parenthood doctrines usually (though not always)364 are pursued when a legal parent who fostered
and expressly consented to the relationship between the petitioner and
child subsequently denies the petitioner access to the child following the
demise of the parties’ romantic relationship.365 It is hard to see how the
potential for conflict is lower in situations where both legal parents had
expressly consented to the relationship between the petitioner and the
child and then subsequently seek to deny the petitioner access to the
child. In fact, as the dissent pointed out in E.N. v. T.R., individuals who
did not previously share an intimate or personal relationship may in some
361. E.N. v. T.R., 255 A.3d 1, 44–45 (Md. 2021) (Biran, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 44; see also supra notes 111, 355–358 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 178, 195, 199, 202 and accompanying text.
364. See E.N., 255 A.3d at 7.
365. See supra notes 107–113 and accompanying text. But see E.N., 255 A.3d at 7 (addressing a situation in which the partner of the child’s father, who was incarcerated, sought
to establish parentage although she still shared an intact relationship with the father).
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instances co-parent more effectively than individuals who did.366 Importantly, courts are well versed in creating custody orders aimed at protecting children in situations where some level of conflict exists between the
parents. Regardless of whether a custody dispute involves two parents or
multiple parents, courts can, and should, create custody orders that take
into account the level of conflict among the parents. This may involve, for
example, adopting an order that does not grant all of the parties shared
physical or legal custody.367
As noted above, however, even if it is arguably permissible to adopt a
rule requiring the consent of only one of the existing legal parents, it is
nonetheless important to address the reality that, as prior cases make
clear, a significant number of states likely will require the consent of all
existing legal parents for constitutional (state or federal) or policy-related
reasons.368 To minimize the potential of harm to the child, it is essential
that states that require the consent of all existing legal parents for multiparentage establishment through equitable parenthood doctrines adopt a
broad definition of consent. More specifically, these states should adopt a
definition of consent that includes both express and implied consent.
With regard to implied consent, the definition should make clear that
consent can occur through a parent’s acts, omissions, or absences that
“create a vacuum in terms of care and nurture [of the child] that is filled
by the de facto parent relationship.”369 The definition should further
specify that parents who voluntarily have been largely uninvolved in their
children’s lives for a substantial period have, through their actions, implicitly consented to the formation of a parent-like relationship between
the child and another party.
States should not adopt the approach to implied consent set forth by
the majority in E.N. v. T.R., which requires that for implied consent to
occur through inaction, the parent must have “knowingly” failed to object
to the formation of the relationship between the petitioner and child.370
Such an approach is problematic: it allows the fact that the child has an
uninvolved parent who has not made the effort to obtain basic knowledge
about their child’s life, including who they are living with and who is providing care for them, to prevent legal recognition of the parent–child relationship between the petitioner and child. In contrast, an approach that
equates substantial parental noninvolvement with implied consent will at
least ensure that the fact that a parent has chosen to be uninvolved in
their child’s life for a substantial period of time does not prevent legal
recognition of the relationship between the child and an individual who
has filled the parental gap in the child’s life resulting from the existing
366. E.N., 255 A.3d at 45 (Biran, J., dissenting).
367. See Cahn & Carbone, supra note 170, at 405.
368. See supra Section IV.A.1.
369. Martin v. MacMahan, 264 A.3d 1224, 1236 (Me. 2021); see also In re Parentage of
J.B.R., 336 P.3d 648, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (finding implied consent when the legal
parent had been absent from the child’s life for over ten years).
370. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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parent’s lack of involvement.371 Failure to adopt this broader definition of
consent would lead to unjust results and a greater likelihood of harm to
the child in question.
Finally, in terms of other function-based parentage establishment
mechanisms that (arguably) require the express consent of an existing legal parent, such as holding out provisions, the question of whether the
consent of all existing legal parents should be required in the multi-parentage context depends on how such provisions are interpreted.372 If a
holding out provision is interpreted to require the existence of a relationship that is parental in nature between the petitioner and child, there is a
strong argument that a standard that either requires the consent of only
one legal parent or requires the consent of all existing legal parents but
adopts a broad definition of consent is permissible for reasons similar to
those discussed in the context of multi-parentage establishment through
equitable parenthood doctrines. If, however, a state’s holding out provision can be satisfied without proving the existence of a relationship that is
parental in nature, the express consent of all existing legal parents should
be required for the reasons set forth in the subsection below addressing
multi-parentage claims through mechanisms that do not require an established parent–child relationship.373
b. Adoption and Other Parentage Establishment Mechanisms that
Do Not Require an Established Parent–Child
Relationship
A number of legislatures and courts expressly have recognized adoption procedures in which the existing legal parent(s) retain their status as
legal parent(s) as a mechanism through which multi-parentage can occur.
In the two-party parentage context, the express consent of the existing
legal parent is required in order for that parent’s spouse or partner to
adopt the child through step- or second-parent adoption procedures.
When multi-parentage recognition is sought through adoption, the express consent of all existing legal parents should be required. Indeed, all
of the statutory and judicial developments discussed above recognizing
multi-parentage through adoption appear to involve situations in which
371. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
372. Although the language of most states’ holding out provisions does not explicitly
require an existing parent’s consent, in the vast majority of circumstances the holding out
could not occur without the consent of at least one existing legal parent, and thus the
requirement of consent arguably can be inferred. See R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836,
850 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that the holding out provision did not violate the existing
legal parent’s fundamental rights because “by its very nature the presumption will arise
only if the single parent allows the circumstances to evolve to a point where the person is
holding out the child as his or her own and receiving the child into his or her home for
purposes of parental caretaking”); Jeffrey A. Parness, Unconstitutional Parenthood, 104
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 190–91 (2020) (“Residency or hold out parentage, as a form of parentage . . . can be grounded on the actual, apparent, or presumed consents by existing legal
parents.”).
373. See supra Section IV.A.2.
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all of the parties were in agreement regarding the adoption.374 There are
both constitutional and policy-related concerns that support requiring the
express consent of all existing legal parents in the adoption context.
In terms of constitutional concerns, the critical distinction between
adoption and equitable parenthood doctrines is that an individual does
not need to have formed a bonded, dependent relationship with the child
that is parental in nature in order to establish parentage through adoption.375 As a result, unlike equitable parenthood doctrines, adoption does
not require the existence of the type of extraordinary circumstances that
outweigh the fundamental rights of existing legal parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children. Regarding
policy-related considerations, there is a far weaker argument that failure
to recognize multi-parentage necessarily will harm the child when the
mechanism through which the petitioner is seeking to establish parentage
does not require the existence of a relationship that is parental in nature
between the petitioner and child. As a result, in this context, the child’s
interests in recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent do not outweigh
the concerns regarding fairness to the non-consenting parent and the likelihood of increased conflict among the child’s parents if the adoption is
granted against the wishes of one of the existing legal parents.376 For the
reasons discussed in the subsection above, in situations where one of the
existing legal parents will not consent to the adoption, but extraordinary
circumstances involving an established parent–child relationship between
the petitioner and child are present, an equitable parenthood doctrine is a
more appropriate mechanism for establishing parentage.
If states choose to recognize multi-parentage through the other parentage establishment mechanisms that require the existing legal parent’s express consent in the two-party parentage context but do not require an
established parent–child relationship, similar constitutional and policybased reasons support requiring the express consent of all parties. These
mechanisms include, for example, consent to ART provisions, VAPs, and
any other forms of parentage agreements that the jurisdiction may recognize. The arguments against requiring the express consent of all parties
are even weaker in this context than in the adoption context. This is because these methods of parentage establishment generally are undertaken prior to or at the time of the child’s conception or birth, when none
of the parties (aside from the person gestating the child) could yet have
formed a close relationship with the child.
It is important to recognize that there are some significant downsides
to requiring the express consent of all existing legal parents for multi374. See supra notes 227–58 and accompanying text.
375. 2 HARALAMBIE, supra note 92, § 14:04.
376. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 159, at 759 (“[L]egislation should require consent of
all parents as a condition of granting a non-exclusive adoption. Present disagreements between potential parents regarding their respective legal statuses suggests too high of a risk
of future conflicts—the precise concern regarding multiple parenthood that any non-exclusive adoption statute should attempt to avoid.”).
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parentage to occur through adoption. Such an approach allows for the
possibility that a legal parent could, out of bitterness, resentment, or
some other reason unrelated to the child’s well-being, single-handedly
prevent the spouse or partner of the other legal parent from establishing
parentage, even when the individual has formed a parent-like relationship with the child. Not all states that recognize multi-parentage will allow for parentage establishment to occur through an equitable
parenthood doctrine, meaning adoption may be the only option for an
individual who has formed a parental relationship with the child to establish parentage. Moreover, even if all states do eventually recognize multiparentage through equitable parenthood doctrines, there are still downsides to requiring individuals who have formed a parental bond with the
child to pursue this mechanism as opposed to adoption. For example, equitable parenthood doctrines generally require an individual to serve in a
parental role for a significant amount of time, leaving both the child and
the person serving in a parental role without essential rights and protections in the interim.377 In addition, unlike adoption procedures, equitable
parenthood claims usually are not pursued unless and until the relationship the petitioner shared with one of the child’s legal parents has broken
down.378 The result is that there will be a substantial period of time in
which the child and petitioner lack essential rights and protections that
would have attached to their relationship much earlier if adoption had
been an option.
These issues, however, can be ameliorated to a significant extent
through solutions that do not involve infringing on the non-consenting
parent’s fundamental constitutional rights. For example, not only should
states that have not yet done so enact equitable parenthood doctrines for
parentage establishment, states also should make clear that these mechanisms are available even when the relationship shared between the petitioner and the legal parent(s) is intact. Other steps that states could take
to protect the relationship between a child and someone they view as a
parent include adopting standards granting standing to seek custody and
visitation to individuals who have formed a parent-like relationship with
the child.
B. THE NUMBER

OF

PARENTS

1. The Question
When the subject of multi-parentage is broached, usually one of the
first questions that arises is whether there will be any limit set on how
many individuals can establish themselves as a child’s legal parents. There
are strong arguments both for and against establishing a firm limit on the
number of individuals who can establish legal parentage. On the one
hand, many commentators, including advocates in favor of multi-parent377. See supra Section II.H.
378. See generally Feinberg, supra note 106.
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age recognition, have expressed concern that allowing too many individuals to attain legal parentage will be harmful to children.379 One aspect of
this concern focuses on the harm to children that can come from having
“too many cooks in the kitchen.”380 The greater the number of individuals who are tasked with the wide variety of decisions, small and big, that
parents must make about raising their children, the higher the likelihood
that disagreements will arise among the child’s parents.381 This can lead
to a situation in which “no parent can effectively accomplish his or her
task without being undercut by someone else.”382 It also could result in
greater state intervention in children’s lives and more frequent litigation
regarding custody, visitation, and child support—occurrences that are
widely considered to be harmful to children’s well-being.383 Moreover,
regardless of whether the disputes end up in court, children often suffer
when their parents’ relationship is marked by frequent disagreements and
contentiousness regarding co-parenting decisions.384
Another aspect of the concerns about a child having too many legal
parents is that the more parents a child has, the more likely it is that the
child will need to split their time among multiple households. This can
lead to the child experiencing feelings of instability, insecurity, and lack
of belonging.385 It also may make it harder for the child to form strong
bonds with each of their parents.386 A related fear is that “fractured family units resulting from break-ups would be all the more painful for children if they have three or four parents who they may feel are owed their
allegiance—a child might feel caught not just between two worlds, but
between three or four.”387 Finally, some commentators have argued that
setting a cap is necessary to ensure that the law is not facilitating parentage establishment among individuals in cults or cult-like settings.388
On the other hand, capping how many legal parents a child can have at
a certain number may not be the best way to address these concerns.
Identifying one number as the absolute maximum number of legal par379. See, e.g., Cahn & Carbone, supra note 141, at 39–40; Jacobs, supra note 15, at 326;
Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigned Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative
Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 329, 390 (1995); Mallory Ullrich, Tri-Parenting on
the Rise: Paving the Way for Tri-Parenting Families to Receive Legal Recognition Through
Preconception Agreements, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 909, 924 (2019).
380. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 326; Elizabeth A. Pfenson, Too Many Cooks in the
Kitchen: The Potential Concerns of Finding More Parents and Fewer Legal Strangers in
California’s Recently-Proposed Multiple-Parents Bill, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023, 2023
(2013); Ullrich, supra note 379, at 924.
381. Appleton, supra note 4, at 41; Jacobs, supra note 15, at 326; Ullrich, supra note
379, at 924.
382. Pfenson, supra note 380, at 2060.
383. Baker, supra note 15, at 675; Ullrich, supra note 379, at 925.
384. ABRAMS, CAHN, ROSS & MCCLAIN, supra note 139, at 774–75.
385. King, supra note 379, at 391; Ullrich, supra note 379, at 924–25.
386. Pamela Gatos, Third-Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay Families, 26 VT. L.
REV. 195, 216 (2001).
387. Pfenson, supra note 380, at 2060; see also King, supra note 379, at 391.
388. See Paula Gerber & Phoebe Irving Lindner, Birth Certificates for Children with
Same-Sex Parents: A Reflection of Biology or Something More?, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 225, 261 (2015).
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ents a child possibly could have is arguably arbitrary and unwise given the
wide variety of family forms in existence today and the unique attributes
of every family.389 For example, four or more parents who share a collaborative and cooperative co-parenting relationship may provide a healthier environment for a child than two parents who have a hostile and
contentious relationship. Thus, some commentators argue that the better
approach is to make determinations regarding how many legal parents a
child can have based on that specific child’s interests, the relationship
among the potential parents, and the overall circumstances of the family
in question.390
2. Thoughts on Resolving the Question
Thus far, none of the statutes providing for multi-parentage include a
cap on the number of legal parents, and this is the better approach.391
The number of legal parents a child should have depends on the unique
characteristics of the family in question. For some families, the number of
parents should be capped at two. For others, capping the number at three
will make the most sense. For yet others, the appropriate number will be
four or more. It is unnecessary for states to choose one number as the
absolute maximum. There are better, less arbitrary ways of ensuring that
the law does not recognize a multi-parentage familial structure that
would be contrary to the well-being of the particular child in question. In
fact, there are already several important aspects of existing laws governing multi-parentage that have the effect of limiting the number of legal parents a child can have without setting forth an arbitrary numerical
cap.
In the states that recognize multi-parentage, a party seeking to establish parentage of a child who already has two parents must qualify as a
legal parent pursuant to one of the parentage establishment mechanisms
recognized in the two-party parentage context.392 Not only that, but the
mechanism also must be one through which multi-parentage can be established in the jurisdiction.393 A jurisdiction may only recognize certain
mechanisms as available for multi-parentage establishment, and the
mechanisms that are available may have strict requirements that few people would be able to satisfy.394 Thus, even a person who has a basis for
389. See Appleton, supra note 4, at 68 (“A one-size-fits-all rule . . . strikes me as too
blunt to constitute a child-centered rule about how many legal parents a particular child
may have. . . . I favor a more pluralistic and nuanced approach that respects diversity
among families and is sufficiently capacious to honor a given child’s experience.”).
390. Id.; Gatos, supra note 386, at 216 (“By focusing on the role of the parties in a
family of consent, and the relationships between the parents, the law does not have to
determine a maximum number of parents a child may have.”).
391. See supra Section III.B.
392. See supra Section III.B.
393. See supra Section III.B.
394. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (responding to
the fear that a child could have too many legal parents pursuant to the psychological parentage doctrine by noting the significant difficulty of satisfying the doctrine).
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parentage establishment that would be recognized in the two-party parentage context may not have a basis for establishing parentage that is
recognized in the multi-parentage context.395
In addition, establishing multi-parentage requires judicial approval,
and even when an individual can prove that they have a basis for establishing parentage that the jurisdiction recognizes as one through which
multi-parentage can occur, there is often an additional substantive determination that a court must make before recognizing multi-parentage.396
This additional step makes multi-parentage establishment even more difficult. For example, under the approaches of California, Washington,
Connecticut, and the 2017 UPA, a court cannot recognize multi-parentage unless “the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be
detrimental to the child.”397 Vermont has adopted a best interests—as
opposed to detriment—standard for the additional substantive determination.398 These types of safeguards reduce significantly the risk that a
harmful number of people will be able to establish themselves as a child’s
legal parents.
Finally, even if in a later custody or visitation dispute between the parents it turns out that there are, in fact, “too many cooks in the kitchen,”
the court would have the discretion to structure an order governing custody and visitation in a manner that protected the child from harm. While
in some jurisdictions there are presumptions in favor of awarding joint
legal and physical custody among the child’s legal parents, all jurisdictions
recognize that the best interests of the child is the paramount concern in
custody determinations and that joint custody should not be ordered
where it would be contrary to the child’s best interests.399 Furthermore,
while fit legal parents generally have a right to visitation, a court may
deny a parent visitation if it determines that such visitation would be detrimental to the child.400 As a number of scholars persuasively have advocated, states should make clear that these well-established principles
carry over to the multi-parentage context, and that courts do not have to
provide each parent with custody or visitation rights where it would be
contrary to the child’s best interests.401 California law provides a helpful
395. For example, Delaware provides for multi-parentage only through satisfaction of
its de facto parentage doctrine, and Louisiana recognizes multi-parentage only when a
child is born to a different-sex married couple and the husband is not the child’s biological
father. See supra Section III.B.1. In addition, the 2017 UPA provides that a VAP is void if
the child already has a second presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated parent, which presumably excludes VAPs as a method through which multi-parentage can be established.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
396. See supra Section III.B.
397. See supra notes 178, 199–205 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
399. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Joint Custody
of Children, 17 A.L.R. 4th 1013 (1982).
400. ABRAMS, CAHN, ROSS & MCCLAIN, supra note 139, at 911.
401. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 15, at 326, 333, 338; Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage
Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 379, 381–82 (2007).
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template for states to follow in this context, instructing that “[i]n cases
where a child has more than two parents . . . [t]he court may order that
not all parents share legal or physical custody of the child if the court
finds that it would not be in the best interest of the child.”402 Overall, a
cap on the number of legal parents is not necessary—there are a number
of steps states can take to protect children from the risk of harm related
to having too many legal parents while still respecting the rich diversity in
family structures that exists today.
C. RESPECTING LGBTQ+ FAMILIES
1. The Question
The final question that this Article will address regarding the boundaries of multi-parentage is how to structure multi-parentage laws in a way
that minimizes the risk of courts using such laws to impose a hetero- and
bio-normative family structure on LGBTQ+ families. A number of scholars have expressed concerns about the potential for hetero- and bio-normative biases to influence judges’ decisions in the multi-parentage
context.403 Indeed, at least one multi-parentage advocate has explicitly
identified the potential of “filling the gap of the missing ‘gender’” in families headed by same-sex parents as a reason for why states should recognize multi-parentage.404
One common scenario in which this issue may be particularly likely to
arise involves LGBTQ+ couples who utilize known gamete providers to
conceive their children. LGBTQ+ couples may choose to obtain gametes
from a known—as opposed to anonymous—provider for various reasons.
These reasons may include, “concern for the future medical and emotional needs of the child,” a higher comfort level conceiving with the gametes of someone the couple knows, or cost-related considerations.405 In
many cases, while the couple intends for the known gamete provider to
have some level of contact with the child, they do not intend for the provider to play a parental role (i.e., they do not intend to create a multiparentage family structure).406 Over the years, there have been a number
of cases in which a known sperm provider seeks to establish parentage
against the wishes of a same-sex couple, and the parties dispute whether
the sperm provider should be considered a donor with no parental rights
402. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(e) (West 2021).
403. Appleton, supra note 4, at 54–55; Fiona Kelly, Nuclear Norms or Fluid Families?
Incorporating Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children into Canadian Family Law, 21
CAN. J. FAM. L. 133, 140, 172 (2004); NeJaime, supra note 19, at 2362.
404. Yehezkel Margalit, Artificial Insemination from Donor (AID)—From Status to
Contract and Back Again?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 100–01 (2015).
405. Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created with Known
Sperm Providers: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41, 64 (2016);
see also Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
406. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358; Leckie v. Voorhries, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994); Cahn & Carbone, supra note 170, at 406; Forman, supra note 405, at 47.
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and responsibilities or, instead, a legal parent.407
Historically, the results of such cases were mixed and difficult to predict.408 In many states, donor non-paternity laws state that a man who
provides sperm to a licensed physician for use in the insemination of a
woman other than his wife—a process that typically includes the man
signing a consent form agreeing to relinquish parental rights409—is not
the legal parent of any resulting children unless the parties have agreed
otherwise.410 However, these laws are not always determinative in situations involving same-sex couples and known sperm providers. As an initial matter, it is not clear in all states that donor non-paternity laws
extend to known donors.411 Moreover, even if a state’s donor non-paternity law extends to known donors, it may not apply if the parties failed to
comply with the law’s formal requirements.412 For example, a common
requirement of donor non-paternity laws is that the conception involved
the assistance of a physician413 or medical technology,414 which excludes
situations involving at-home inseminations or conceptions that occur via
sexual intercourse.415 In addition, the language of some donor non-paternity laws refers only to conceptions that occur via insemination, leaving it
unclear whether the law applies to conceptions that occur via other forms
of assisted reproduction.416 In a few jurisdictions, the language of the donor non-paternity law refers only to conceptions by married women.417
Donor non-paternity laws also may not prevent a sperm provider from
establishing parentage where he has played a role in the child’s life after
birth, making the parties’ intent less clear,418 or where he asserts a claim
407. See, e.g., Doherty v. Leon, 472 P.3d 531, 533–34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020); N.A.H. v.
J.S., No. 1537 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 1354356, at *1–3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018); In re
Christopher YY. v. Jessica ZZ., 69 N.Y.S.3d 887, 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); In re Joseph
O. v. Danielle B., 71 N.Y.S.3d 549, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); McNair v. Shannon, No.
CV136017755, 2014 WL 1345353, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2014); Janssen v. Alicea,
30 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007
WL 4636692, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007); K.C.C. v. C.D.A., No. SU-16E-0019
(Mass. Probate & Fam. Ct. Sept. 16, 2016) (on file with author); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d
523, 524 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994); Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 357; Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,
224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
408. Forman, supra note 405, at 43.
409. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A
Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 396 (2013).
410. Feinberg, supra note 21, at 121.
411. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 3:15 (“A number of courts have
considered whether gamete donor statutes are applicable in cases in which the donor was
known to the recipient. Courts have reached conflicting conclusions with respect to this
question.”).
412. Id. § 3:14.
413. Id. § 3:13.
414. Bruce v. Boardwine, 770 S.E.2d 774, 777 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
415. See Forman, supra note 405, at 53.
416. See Patton v. Vanterpool, 806 S.E.2d 493, 494 (Ga. 2017); JOSLIN, MINTER &
SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 3:21.
417. JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, § 3:13.
418. C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994); Thomas S. v. Robin
Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); JOSLIN, MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note
49, § 3:16.
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for parentage that is not based solely on genetics, such as having satisfied
a holding out provision.419
Due to the varying characteristics of states’ donor non-paternity laws,
in some of the earlier cases involving a same-sex couple who had conceived a child via non-sexual means with sperm from a known provider,
the court recognized the sperm provider as the child’s second legal parent.420 These cases, however, generally occurred at a time when non-biological parents in same-sex relationships lacked significant access to
mechanisms that would establish them as the child’s parent at the time of
birth—such as the marital presumption, consent to ART provisions, and
VAPs.421 As a result, in these cases the child did not already have two
legal parents when the sperm provider sought parentage.422
In recent years, however, the state of the law governing same-sex parents has changed dramatically. While there is still progress to be made,
particularly in the context of unmarried same-sex couples, today samesex couples have more avenues available for establishing both members
as their child’s legal parents than ever before.423 This is especially true of
married same-sex couples, who can establish parentage at the time of the
child’s birth through a variety of mechanisms including, inter alia, the
marital presumption and spousal consent to ART provisions.424 Along
with broader legal rights and protections for LGBTQ+ individuals and
families has come significantly greater societal respect for the integrity of
such families.425 These developments have changed the analysis in cases
involving parentage disputes between same-sex couples and known gamete providers.
In recent years, a number of courts have addressed the claims of known
sperm providers in situations in which the child was conceived via nonsexual means and born to a member of a married same-sex couple. The
trend thus far in such cases has been for the court to recognize the spouse
419. Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing
the donor to establish parentage through the state’s holding out provision); JOSLIN,
MINTER & SAKIMURA, supra note 49, §§ 3:16, 3:18.
420. See, e.g., Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692, at *13 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007); Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362; C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 525; Jhordan C. v.
Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
421. See Browne, 2007 WL 4636692, at *13; Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362; C.O., 639
N.E.2d at 525; Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537–38.
422. See Browne, 2007 WL 4636692, at *13; Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362; C.O., 639
N.E.2d at 525; Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537–38; see also Forman, supra note 405, at 59
(noting that these cases revealed “the particular vulnerability of single women and lesbian
couples who choose this method of family building”). In one recent case involving a samesex couple and a known sperm provider, the sperm provider was able to establish legal
parentage, but the same-sex couple either did not assert, or waived, any claim that the
member of the same-sex couple who did not give birth was the child’s second legal parent.
N.A.H. v. J.S., No. 1537 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 1354356, at *6–7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 16,
2018).
423. See supra Part II.
424. See id.
425. LGBT Rights, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NK49-RWV6].
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of the individual who gave birth as the child’s second legal parent and to
deny the known sperm provider’s claim of parentage.426 The courts in
these cases have set forth various reasons for their decisions. These reasons include: (1) that a petitioner’s genetic ties to a child, standing alone,
was not a basis for rebutting the marital presumption when the child was
conceived through assisted reproduction and born to a married same-sex
couple;427 (2) that while both the marital presumption and the genetic
testing presumption applied in the case, the marital presumption controlled because it was based on weightier considerations of policy and
logic in situations where the married same-sex couple intended to raise
the child;428 (3) that the petitioner’s claim was barred by equitable estoppel because he had “led [the same-sex couple] to reasonably believe that
he would not assert—and had no interest in acquiring—any parental
rights;”429 (4) that allowing the petitioner’s claim to proceed would be
contrary to the best interests of a child who considered the same-sex
couple to be her parents;430 and (5) that the petitioner had not satisfied
the jurisdiction’s standing requirement for putative fathers who seek to
rebut the marital presumption because he had not formed a substantial
relationship with the child.431 In each of the cases, the court noted that
because it would disrupt the relationship the child shared with someone
they viewed as a parent as well as the child’s core understanding of their
family, granting the sperm provider legal parentage would result in significant harm to the child.432
While these cases recognizing the integrity of families headed by
LGBTQ+ parents have represented welcome developments for such families, there is a fear that multi-parentage will undo the progress that has
occurred. More specifically, there is a fear that if a court has the power to
recognize more than two legal parents, it will be more likely to recognize
a known sperm provider as a legal parent even if he would have been
unsuccessful in displacing the spouse or partner of the person who gave
birth as the child’s second legal parent in the two-party parentage context. While the desire to provide the child with a parent who both shares
genetic ties with the child and fills in the “missing gender” may no longer
426. See, e.g., Doherty v. Leon, 472 P.3d 531, 536–37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020); In re Christopher YY. v. Jessica ZZ., 69 N.Y.S.3d 887, 898–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); In re Joseph O.
v. Danielle B., 71 N.Y.S.3d 549, 553–54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); K.C.C. v. C.D.A., No. SU16E-0019 (Mass. Probate & Fam. Ct. Sept. 16, 2016) (on file with author).
427. Christopher YY., 69 N.Y.S.3d at 898–99.
428. Doherty, 472 P.3d at 535–37.
429. Christopher YY., 69 N.Y.S.3d at 898; see also Joseph O., 71 N.Y.S.3d at 553–54
(holding that the petitioner’s claim was barred by equitable estoppel because “it [was]
undisputed that all of the parties intended that the petitioner would not be a parent to the
child, even if they did contemplate some amount of contact after birth”); Doherty, 472 P.3d
at 538–39 (holding that the petitioner’s claim was barred by equitable estoppel due to his
agreement with the same-sex couple that he would have no parental rights).
430. Christopher YY., 69 N.Y.S.3d at 898–99; Joseph O., 71 N.Y.S.3d at 553–54.
431. K.C.C., No. SU-16E-0019, at *7.
432. Doherty, 472 P.3d at 536–37; Christopher YY., 69 N.Y.S.3d at 893, 898; Joseph O.,
71 N.Y.S.3d at 553–54; K.C.C., No. SU-16E-0019, at *7.
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be enough to elevate the sperm provider’s claim for parentage over the
claim of the spouse or partner of the person who gave birth, it could be
enough to identify the sperm provider as a third legal parent.
There are various ways in which hetero- and bio-normative biases
could factor into the multi-parentage analysis. For example, a court may
be less strict in its analysis of whether the petitioner has satisfied one of
the grounds for establishing parentage recognized in the jurisdiction, including erring on the side of allowing the petitioner to assert geneticsbased grounds when there is a dispute regarding the application of a donor non-paternity law. Discrimination against LGBTQ+ couples also may
arise in the final part of the multi-parentage analysis, when the court determines whether recognizing multi-parentage under the circumstances
would promote the child’s best interests or not recognizing multi-parentage would be detrimental to the child. A court could potentially rely on
the fact of the missing gender among the child’s existing legal parents or
the sperm provider’s biological ties to the child to determine that the best
interests or detriment standard is satisfied.
If a jurisdiction’s recognition of multi-parentage leads to known sperm
providers being able to establish parentage in situations in which their
claims otherwise would be denied, it would lead to harm and instability
for LGBTQ+ couples who conceived their children with the intent to be
the child’s sole legal parents. As one court explained, allowing sperm
providers to obtain parentage in these circumstances “exposes children
born into same-gender marriages to instability for no justifiable reason
other than to provide a father-figure for children who already have two
parents.”433 As the court correctly observed, “This would be indefensible . . . . [I]t would undermine the ‘compelling public policy of protecting children conceived via [assisted reproduction].’”434 While protecting
families headed by LGBTQ+ parents from potential judicial bias is a
complex undertaking, there are a number of steps states could take to
minimize the effects of such bias.
2. Thoughts on Resolving the Question
It is important to note that while the concerns above are warranted and
must be addressed, in some situations the recognition of multi-parentage
actually may benefit LGBTQ+ couples by allowing both members to obtain parentage in situations where only one of the members otherwise
would have been able to do so.435 For example, courts may be less likely
to identify the same-sex spouse or partner of the individual who gave
birth as the child’s second parent over the person whose sperm was used
to conceive the child when the conception occurred through sexual
433. Christopher YY., 69 N.Y.S.3d at 898–99.
434. Id. at 899.
435. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 170, at 404.
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means.436 The New York case Q.M. v. B.C. is illustrative.437 There, during
a period of separation, one member of a married same-sex couple conceived a child through sexual intercourse with a third party.438 The alleged biological father sought to establish paternity, and the individual
who gave birth and her spouse sought to have the spouse recognized as
the child’s legal parent.439 When confronted with competing claims of
parentage from the alleged biological father (on genetics-based grounds)
and the spouse (based on the marital presumption), the court determined
that the spouse was not the child’s legal parent and, thus, that the alleged
biological father could proceed with his claim to establish legal parentage
based on genetic ties to the child.440
The court distinguished this case, in which conception occurred via sexual intercourse, from cases in which both members of a married same-sex
couple consented to one member conceiving a child through assisted reproduction using anonymous donor sperm.441 While in the latter situation
the consent to assisted reproduction statute would provide parentage to
the spouse, in the case at hand, because the conception occurred via sexual intercourse, the spouse was seeking to establish parentage pursuant to
the marital presumption.442 The court explained that it was not required
to recognize the same-sex spouse of an individual who conceives a child
via sexual intercourse with a third party as the child’s legal parent pursuant to the marital presumption because the state’s Marriage Equality Act
“does not require the court to ignore the obvious biological differences
between husbands and wives . . . [and] neither spouse in a same-sex female couple can father a child.”443 If multi-parentage had been an option,
however, the court may have been more likely to also recognize the
spouse as a legal parent.444 Importantly, the steps proposed below, which
are aimed at helping to protect LGBTQ+ parents from having multi-parentage imposed on them in inappropriate circumstances, would be unlikely to dissuade courts from recognizing multi-parentage in appropriate
circumstances where it would benefit LGBTQ+ parents.
An initial step that states should take is to avoid adopting a legal
framework governing multi-parentage that reinforces hetero- and bionormativity. The approach taken in Canada’s Uniform Child Status Act is
436. Compare Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 476 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014) (holding that
the biological father could establish paternity of a child conceived through sexual intercourse and born during a same-sex marriage), with McNair v. Shannon, No. CV 136017755,
2014 WL 1345353, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2014) (denying the putative father
standing to establish paternity of a child conceived through sexual intercourse and born
during a same-sex marriage where the putative father had not formed a relationship with
the child and the child was being raised in a stable family unit).
437. See Q.M., 995 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
438. See id. at 472.
439. See id. at 471.
440. See id. at 476.
441. See id. at 474.
442. See id.
443. Id.
444. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 170, at 404.
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an example of the type of multi-parentage framework that states should
avoid. The Act provides for the recognition of multi-parentage only when
there is a preconception agreement executed by the individual who will
gestate the child, their spouse or common law partner, “and another person(s) who intend(s) to provide their human reproductive material.”445 In
the vast majority of cases, the type of agreement recognized by the Act
will involve a female same-sex couple (one of whom will gestate the
child) and a male sperm provider.446 The province of British Columbia
has adopted a similar approach, limiting multi-parentage recognition to
preconception agreements between (1) intended parents and the “birth
mother,” or (2) the birth mother, the birth mother’s spouse or partner,
and “a donor.”447 As one scholar noted, the practical effect of this type of
approach is that “the only kind of . . . family capable of being created is
one in which a child being raised by same-sex parents will acquire a third
legal parent who is both the child’s other biological progenitor as well as
an individual of the opposite sex.”448
The type of approach reflected in Canada’s Uniform Child Status Act
and British Columbia’s multi-parentage provision sends the message that
the only purpose of multi-parentage is to allow children to have a legally
recognized relationship with individuals with whom they share biological
ties; individuals who, in most cases, will “fill in the gap of the missing
gender.”449 States should seek to avoid sending this message by structuring their multi-parentage laws in a way that does not privilege heteroand bio-normativity. More specifically, states’ multi-parentage laws
should recognize that individuals seeking to establish legal parentage of a
child who already has two legal parents can utilize mechanisms that do
not require the existence of genetic ties. These mechanisms may include,
for example, adoption, equitable parenthood doctrines, holding out provisions, VAPs, and consent to ART provisions.
Another important step for states to take in this context is to make
clear both that donor non-paternity laws extend to known donors and
that an individual who is a donor cannot establish parentage on geneticsbased grounds. The law should specify that a donor can establish parentage only if, without consideration of their genetic ties to the child, they
are able to satisfy one of the other grounds for parentage establishment.
This will help to ensure that a donor is not deemed a legal parent against
a LGBTQ+ couple’s wishes simply because the couple chose a known
donor or allowed the donor to have some degree of contact with the
child.
445. See UNIF. CHILD STATUS ACT § 9 cmt. (UNIF. LAW CONF. OF CAN. 2010).
446. Id. § 9 cmt.
447. Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 30(1)(b) (Can.).
448. Fiona Kelly, Multiple-Parent Families Under British Columbia’s New Family Law
Act: A Challenge to the Supremacy of the Nuclear Family or a Method by Which to Preserve
Biological Ties and Opposite-Sex Parenting?, 47 U.B.C. L. REV. 565, 568 (2014).
449. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
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Finally, states’ multi-parentage provisions should identify the types of
considerations that the court should and should not weigh in the final
step of the multi-parentage analysis. This part of the analysis, depending
on the state, requires the court to determine either that the failure to
recognize multi-parentage would be detrimental to the child or that recognition of multi-parentage would promote the child’s best interests.
There are a number of important steps that states could take in this regard. As an initial matter, states could follow the approach of California
courts in requiring that, in order to satisfy the detriment or best interests
analysis, an individual who is seeking to establish parentage of a child
who already has two existing legal parents in a contested case must prove
that they share a relationship with the child that is parental in nature.450
This is another step that would help ensure that a LGBTQ+ couple who
simply allows their child to have some contact with a known donor does
not risk having a third parent imposed on their family.
The law also should provide that considerations relating to the genders
of the existing legal parents and the individual seeking to establish parentage are improper in the detriment or best interests analysis. Explicitly
excluding gender-based considerations would not be outside the norm for
standards governing best interests determinations. In the custody realm,
most states already specify that in considering the custody arrangement
that would promote the child’s best interests, the court may not give preference to a parent based upon their gender.451 States should also specify,
as California courts have, that the existence of biological ties between the
petitioner and child is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support a finding
that denying the multi-parentage claim would be detrimental to the
child.452 As one court explained, “the fact that [a child’s parents] are both
mothers does not warrant a finding that the child has an interest in knowing the identity of, or having a legal or familial relationship with, the man
who donated sperm that enabled the mother’s conception.”453 While
LGBTQ+ families unfortunately may still sometimes encounter judicial
bias, the proposed steps will help to minimize the risk that such bias will
be determinative of the result in multi-parentage cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal recognition of multi-parentage is increasing at an impressive
pace in the United States. As a result, the time has come to carefully
consider how to structure the laws that will establish the boundaries of
multi-parentage recognition. Important questions remain regarding, inter
450. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also M.M. v. D.V., 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d
361, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (“Accordingly, ‘an appropriate action’ for application of [the
multi-parentage provision] is one in which there is an existing parent–child relationship
between the child and the putative third parent, such that ‘recognizing only two parents
would be detrimental to the child.’”).
451. Feinberg, supra note 52, at 357.
452. M.M., 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 372–73.
453. In re Christopher YY. v. Jessica ZZ., 69 N.Y.S.3d 887, 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
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alia, whether to require the consent of all of the child’s existing legal parents for multi-parentage establishment and the form any required consent
must take, the wisdom of setting a cap on the number of individuals who
can attain legal parentage, and how to ensure that multi-parentage does
not result in a hetero- and bio-normative family structure being imposed
on LGBTQ+ families. Each of these questions raises complex issues that
merit significant attention. The manner through which states choose to
address these questions will have profound and lasting effects on children, parents, and families throughout the United States.

